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ABSTRACT 
Stop Talking about Sorrow: Nixon’s Communications Strategy after Lam Son 719 
by Dominic K. So 
 March 1971 was tough for President Richard Nixon. The American people were tired of 
the Vietnam War, with many still recovering from the violent anti-war protests of 1970. 
Congress had just passed an amendment prohibiting U.S. ground troops from operating outside 
of the borders of South Vietnam. Both the public and secret negotiations with Hanoi were 
stalled. Confidential channels with Beijing and Moscow about diplomatic initiatives had gone 
cold. Moreover, Lam Son 719, the joint U.S. and South Vietnamese incursion into Laos that 
began in February, was turning out to be a failure. The operation, Nixon’s military gamble to 
prove the success of Vietnamization, would show the opposite—that the South Vietnamese were 
not ready to take over the fighting from the Americans.  
 Yet, on 7 April 1971, Nixon announced in a television address that “Vietnamization has 
succeeded,” and that he would accelerate the withdrawal of American troops “because of the 
achievements of the South Vietnamese operation in Laos.” Many expected Nixon to increase the 
rate of troop withdrawals no matter the outcome of Lam Son 719. However, instead of being 
punished at the polls for his lack of credibility, as some in the press were predicting, in 1972, 
Nixon transfixed the nation with trips to Beijing and Moscow and won re-election by 49 out of 
50 states. This thesis mines archival documents from the Nixon Presidential Library, the U.S. 
media, and television transcripts to explain how and why Nixon re-shaped the story of Lam Son 
719 and his Vietnamization policy to persuade a dispirited American people to accept 
withdrawal from Vietnam. This political comeback, often overshadowed by Watergate, provides 
unique perspectives on presidential communications.  
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 1 
Introduction 
“While a picture doesn’t lie, a picture may not tell all the truth.” This was President 
Nixon’s response to Howard K. Smith of ABC News during a television interview on 22 March 
1971. Smith had asked about photos circulating in the press of South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) 
soldiers hanging on the skids of U.S. Army helicopters evacuating Laos.1 By the time of this 22 
March interview, that picture had come to define the joint United States-South Vietnamese 
incursion into Laos in early 1971, an operation named Lam Son 719. The media narrative of Lam 
Son 719, embodied by that image, involved an overwhelmed ARVN fleeing Laos by any means 
possible, including desperately clinging to helicopters transporting wounded soldiers. This story 
of defeat severely undercut the Nixon administration’s plan for withdrawing U.S. troops from 
Vietnam “with honor” through Vietnamization, the process of turning the war over to the South 
Vietnamese.2 By engineering a withdrawal from Vietnam with minimal loss to American 
prestige, Nixon hoped to satisfy a war-weary American public and Congress, bury the specter of 
Vietnam in the past, and move forward with other global endeavors, such as an opening of 
relations with China and détente with the Soviet Union. Achieving this would require a big play. 
A strike at the major North Vietnamese supply route in Laos was that big play. 
Henry Kissinger later wrote of Lam Son 719 that the “operation, conceived in doubt and 
assailed by skepticism, proceeded in confusion.” This mirrored the sentiment in U.S. media by 
mid-March 1971 that Lam Son was a failure. Yet, on 7 April, President Nixon delivered a 
television address, his only one that year regarding Vietnam, declaring, “Vietnamization has 
succeeded,” and that “because of the achievements of the South Vietnamese operation in Laos, I 
                                                            
1 Richard Nixon, "A Conversation With the President," Interview With Howard K. Smith of the American 
Broadcasting Company, 22 March 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/conversation-with-the-president-interview-with-howard-k-
smith-the-american-broadcasting (Hereafter referred to as “Nixon, 22 March Interview”) 
2 James H. Willbanks, A Raid Too Far: Operation Lam Son 719 and Vietnamization in Laos (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2014), 9. 
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am announcing an increase in the rate of American withdrawals.”3 To combat the image of 
ARVN hanging from skids, and the associated depiction of failure, Nixon and his team spun the 
story to one that better supported the administration’s goals, mainly through television 
appearances by the president on 22 March and 7 April.   
The open secret at this time—among the administration, the press, and even the South 
Vietnamese—is that no matter what happened in Lam Son 719, Nixon would call it a success for 
Vietnamization and accelerate U.S. troop withdrawals. Wall Street Journal reporters wrote on 29 
March that “troop withdrawals – pegged more to political pressures in the States than to military 
realities in Indochina – will doubtless continue, or even accelerate, as they probably would have 
whether the Laos operation had ended in a clearcut victory or defeat.”45 Historian James 
Willbanks explains that “Nixon needed Vietnamization to be a success, or at least appear to be 
successful, so that he could carry through with his plan to disengage totally from the war.” In 
1972, after historic trips to Beijing and Moscow, which would forever change the United States’ 
relationship with the world’s largest Communist powers, Nixon was re-elected by a large 
margin. “Nixon to China” remains a catchphrase denoting groundbreaking foreign policy 
success.6 Had Watergate not occurred, Nixon may well be regarded as one of the most successful 
presidents of the twentieth century. If the press and American people generally accepted Lam 
                                                            
3 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979), 1002. Richard Nixon, 
“Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia,” 7 April 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-the-
situation-southeast-asia-0 (Hereafter referred to as “Nixon, 7 April TV Address”) 
4 Peter R. Kann and Richard J. Levine, “Assessing Laos; The Invasion Is Seen As Inconclusive Chapter In an 
Inconclusive War,” The Wall Street Journal, 29 March 1971. Peter R. Kann, “Savannakhet, Laos: A Bad Place to 
Visit, But a Bad Place to Live,” The Wall Street Journal, 29 March 1971.  
5 Willbanks, 174. 
6 Examples of recent uses in media include comparisons to President Donald Trump’s meeting with North Korean 
Leader Kim Jong Un. Jeffery Lord, “Trump Goes to North Korea Is Nixon Goes To China,” The Spectator, 9 March 
2018 (Accessed on 18 September 2019: https://spectator.org/trump-to-north-korea-is-nixon-goes-to-china). 
Benjamin A. Engel, “The Trump-Kim Summit Is No ‘Nixon To China’ Moment,” The Diplomat, 15 March 2018 
(Accessed on 18 September 2019: https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/the-trump-kim-summit-is-no-nixon-to-china-
moment). 
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Son 719 as a failure, and if the administration’s spin was an open secret, why did it work? And, 
what does this tell us about presidential communication? 
By mining archival documents from the Nixon Presidential Library, the U.S. media, and 
transcripts from the president’s two television appearances during this period, this thesis will 
address how and why Nixon re-shaped the story of Lam Son 719 and, more generally, of his 
Vietnamization policy. Ultimately, it argues that Nixon succeeded in persuading the American 
people to accept withdrawal from Vietnam and focus on China and the USSR because he 
correctly read the pulse of the nation. Enough people would either believe his case for 
Vietnamization or just not care. Nixon told a largely dispirited public what they wanted to hear: 
that the United States was leaving Vietnam. Because of other global considerations, domestic 
politics, and decisions made before 1971, President Nixon planned to accelerate the withdrawal 
of U.S. troops from Vietnam no matter the result of Lam Son 719, and Americans accepted that. 
While some Americans truly believed in Vietnamization’s success, most were simply tired of the 
war and supportive of whatever means necessary to put Vietnam in the rearview.   
The most recent works on Lam Son 719—James Willbanks’s A Raid Too Far and Robert 
Sander’s Invasion of Laos—do not delve into this aspect of the campaign.7 A Raid Too Far adds 
to sixteen other books on the Vietnam War written by Willbanks, professor emeritus at the U.S. 
Army’s Command and General Staff College. Invasion of Laos is the first book for former Lam 
Son helicopter pilot Sander, written to memorialize historical details of a significant life 
experience. Both provide comprehensive analyses of the political decisions and military strategy 
that led to the difficulties in Lam Son 719 and both consider the operation a failure, though 
perhaps not “the total debacle portrayed in US media.”8 Nonetheless, Willbanks writes that 
                                                            
7 Robert D. Sander, Invasion of Laos, 1971: Lam Son 719 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014). 
8 Willbanks, 162-163. 
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Nixon’s rosy assessment on television in late-March, in opposition to non-rosy media reports, 
was “highly questionable.” Willbanks also characterizes both Nixon and Kissinger as “trying to 
put the best face on what [they] knew had been a near disastrous performance by some units.”9 
Sander’s analysis ends with the military campaign in March.  
Of the works that focus on the U.S. media during this time, U.S. Army historian William 
Hammond’s Public Affairs: The Military and the Media analyzes the media’s relationship with 
the Nixon administration and the U.S. Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam (MACV) 
during Lam Son 719 in most detail. James Landers’s The Weekly War documents the coverage of 
the main U.S. weekly newsmagazines during this period. This American-centric 
historiographical debate, however, continues to lack a North and South Vietnamese perspective 
of the war, such as that provided by South Vietnamese Army Major-General Nguyen Duy Hinh 
in Lam Son 719, and more recently by historians Ang Cheng Guan in Ending the Vietnam War 
and Lien-Hang Nguyen in Hanoi’s War.10  
This thesis aims to answer the question of how Nixon re-fashioned the account of Lam 
Son 719 to suit his political ends. The first chapter will cover the events that led America into 
Lam Son 719, including a brief history of the North Vietnamese supply route, the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail. The chapter will also record Nixon’s path from his election in 1968 on a promise to end 
the war to the start of Lam Son 719 in 1971. The second chapter will analyze U.S. press 
coverage of Lam Son 719 from mid-March 1971, when coverage of Lam Son 719 reached its 
most negative point, to 7 April 1971 when Nixon delivered his television speech. This press 
                                                            
9 Willbanks, 164. 
10 William M. Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for 
Military History, 1996). James Landers, The Weekly War (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2004).  
Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, Lam Son 719: Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of 
Military History, 1979); Cheng Guan Ang, Ending the Vietnam War: the Vietnamese communists’ perspective (New 
York: Routledge Curzon, 2003). Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for 
Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012). 
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chapter will focus on three weekly newsmagazines—Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World 
Report—and three newspapers—The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall 
Street Journal. The thesis will then shift to the Nixon communication team’s reaction. Chapter 
three will use archival documents and public comments from the administration to map their 
strategy to combat the negative press coverage and decipher how their message morphed from 
mid-March to 7 April in a coordinated effort to spin the public story. This chapter will focus on 
two key points, President Nixon’s 22 March television interview on ABC and his 7 April 
television address. Lastly, Chapter four will analyze the reasons why this strategy succeeded and 
draw perspectives on presidential communication from this short period in 1971.  
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Chapter 1: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and Nixon’s Path to Lam Son 719 
To understand Lam Son 719 and its significance in the context of the Vietnam War, one 
must first understand its target, the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The “Trail” was the North Vietnamese 
Army’s (NVA) supply route running from North Vietnam to South Vietnam through Laos. The 
Vietnamese name for the Trail, the “Truong Song Strategic Supply Route,” is appropriately 
named after the Truong Song, or Annamite Mountain Range, which runs north to south at the 
border of the Vietnams and Laos, characterizing the Trail’s rugged mountain terrain.11 Over 
years, the Trail became a “system of roads, command centers, transshipment points, base areas, 
and way stations.”12 On 19 May 1959, five years after the Communist Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV) asserted its independence from France and four years after western powers met 
in Geneva to create South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese Party Central Military Committee 
instructed supply specialist Vo Bam to organize “a special military communication line to send 
supplies to the revolution in the South and create conditions for its development.” By 20 August, 
Hanoi completed the first successful supply mission down the Trail. In 1961, the DRV moved 
the Trail slightly west, from the South Vietnamese city of Khe Sanh into the Laotian city of 
Tchepone along Route 9 in response to disruption by South Vietnamese troops. In 1964, though 
it meant covering greater distances, they again extended southern portions of the Trail much 
further west into Laos for extra security and additional connections into South Vietnam. The area 
around Tchepone remained a major stop, near the demilitarized zone separating North and South 
Vietnam. This post-1964 Trail remained the structure that U.S. and South Vietnamese military 
forces periodically attempted to disrupt until the fall of Saigon in 1975.  
                                                            
11 John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1999), xiii. Much of the information contained in the following section on the Ho Chi Minh Trail can be found in 
The Blood Road, specifically on pages 9, 13, 15, 25-26, 77-78, 92-93, 95, 97, 110, 160, 221, and 268-269. 
12 Willbanks, 24. Robert D. Sander also provides a history of the Laotian portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 
Invasion of Laos. 
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According to historian and national security analyst John Prados, the “course of the 
Vietnam War became a competition between Hanoi’s efforts to create and sustain an umbilical 
cord and American attempts to cut that cord or at least obstruct it.” From 1961, when the Trail 
became the target of a CIA intelligence-gathering program, the United States gradually escalated 
its attacks, including aerial bombing and ground combat. These increases were in conjunction 
with general escalations of the Vietnam War. In December 1964, President Johnson approved 
Operation Barrel Roll, a sustained air bombing campaign against northern portions of the Trail in 
reaction to the communists’ attack on the American base at Bien Hoa. The next year, the U.S. 
Air Force undertook multiple aerial bombing campaigns attacking the Trail.13 
In March 1965, Johnson also approved cross-border ground attacks by the U.S. Army’s 
clandestine “Special Operations Group” to complement the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign. 
Later operations in 1967 incorporated new technologies such as mud-making chemicals 
(Operation Commando Lava) and artificial rainmaking (Project Compatriot). During Operation 
Commando Hunt in 1968, U.S. military technicians used electronic sensors to monitor 
movement patterns and tried to predict where the enemy would be at future points. Prados 
likened this cat-and-mouse struggle to a pinball game and its technicians to “pinball wizards.”14  
The myriad of U.S. and South Vietnamese attacks on the Trail through the 1960s, 
whether by air or land, covert or overt, failed to fully disrupt the Trail. In 1968, the Communists 
achieved a momentum shift with the Tet Offensive. Some argued that statistics showed Tet to be 
an American victory. However, the Tet Offensive enabled Hanoi to establish full control and 
                                                            
13 Prados, The Blood Road, 19. Raids on the Trail in 1965 included: retaliation strikes for North Vietnamese attacks 
on the U.S. base in Pleiku, Operation Steel Tiger, and Operation Tiger Hound, all in 1965. Ibid., 95, 110, 159. 
14 Ibid., 97, 268-269. 
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security over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in a way they never could before.15 Politically back in the 
United States, the Tet Offensive also contributed to President Johnson’s withdrawal from the 
race for re-election. This paved the path for Richard Nixon to win the 1968 election with the 
promise of a new approach to ending the Vietnam War. 
In March 1968, while on the campaign trail in New Hampshire, presidential candidate 
Richard Nixon first voiced his views on the Vietnam War in public. He said that the United 
States could end the war by “mobilizing our economic and political and diplomatic leadership.” 
Former National Security Council (NSC) staffer Peter Rodman recalled that this 
“transmogrified” into a cliché that Nixon said he had a “secret plan” to end the war. Nixon wrote 
in his memoirs that he would never have said that he had a plan, let alone a secret plan, but that 
he “believed that we were not making adequate use of our vast diplomatic resources and powers” 
and that the solution was in Peking and Moscow rather than in Hanoi.16 Nixon’s thinking behind 
the vagueness, which led to the “secret plan” criticisms, is questionable. Still, Nixon began his 
first term in office with an American public counting on him to end the war. 
After Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird made his first visit to South Vietnam in March 
1969, he returned with optimism about ARVN capabilities and argued that the American mission 
should focus on strengthening the ARVN to take over more of the wartime nation’s security. 
This would allow for further U.S. troop withdrawals. Nixon would write later that the 
undertaking of Vietnamization, the term Laird coined for this policy, was “another turning point 
in my administration’s Vietnam strategy.”17 In actuality, this idea to “strengthen the Saigon 
                                                            
15 The U.S. abandonment of their base at Khe Sanh, located very close to the border between Laos and South 
Vietnam, marked a significant military win for Hanoi. Prados writes that this helped to “clear the flanks of the 
Trail.” Ibid., 283. 
16 Conrad Black, Richard Nixon: A Life in Full (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 516. Peter W. Rodman, More 
Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1994), 124. Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1978), 298. 
17 Nixon, RN, 392. 
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forces and begin unilateral withdrawals of U.S. troops while negotiating” was not that different 
from what the Johnson Administration had been attempting for years. Nonetheless, 
Vietnamization provided the rationale for which Nixon was searching to withdraw U.S. troops.18 
By October 1969, the American public was losing patience with the new administration’s 
lack of progress on the war. The anti-war movement was becoming increasingly vocal. 
Newsweek’s headline for its 13 October issue illustratively read, “Nixon in Trouble.”19 The 
administration had been in power for over nine months and even Nixon admitted, “No progress 
whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.” On 3 
November, the president delivered a television address soon dubbed the “Silent Majority 
Speech.” In the speech, Nixon revealed the offers that the United States had made toward the 
North Vietnamese, including his secret personal letter to Ho Chi Minh, and argued that it was the 
North Vietnamese who were unwilling to compromise. He gave reasons why an immediate, 
unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops would be dangerous, and argued the merits of 
Vietnamization and diplomacy with other Communist powers, factors that could sway the DRV. 
He also called those citizens who disagreed with his plan a “vocal minority,” and ended the 
speech with an appeal to the “silent majority” of Americans for their support. A Gallup poll 
showed that Nixon’s approval rating increased from 56 to 67 percent right after the speech.20 
However, this political momentum would last no more than six months.  
In April 1970, Nixon approved a joint U.S.-ARVN incursion into Cambodia to attack 
NVA sanctuaries as well as the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), “the headquarters 
                                                            
18 Prados, The Blood Road, 289. Willbanks, 10. 
19 Black, 641. 
20 President Nixon used the “shape of the bargaining table” line in the Silent Majority Speech. Richard Nixon, 
“Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam,” 3 November 1969. Online by the Richard Nixon Presidential 
Library and Museum, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/2018-08/silentmajority_transcript.pdf. David 
Coleman, “Nixon’s Presidential Approval Ratings,” History in Pieces, accessed on 20 October 2019 
https://historyinpieces.com/research/nixon-approval-ratings. 
 
 10 
for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam.” Nixon further explained in his 
30 April television address that this operation would “protect our men who are in Vietnam and to 
guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization programs.”21 The U.S. 
Air Force had been covertly bombing Cambodia since 1969 with little effect on stopping supply 
traffic, but this was the first ground offensive into Cambodia. While President Nixon announced 
that Cambodia was “the most successful operation of this long and very difficult war,” scholars 
continue to debate the military outcome of this incursion. Some consider 1970 to be the high 
point of Vietnamization and U.S. achievement in the Vietnam War. Others note Nixon’s 
convenient omission of the failed search for COSVN in later remarks and question the numbers 
of enemies killed and supplies captured as touted by the administration as measures of success.22 
Regardless of military victory or failure, the Cambodian incursion ignited a political bomb 
domestically, eroding any positive sentiment Nixon gained from the Silent Majority speech.23 
 Protests spread across universities in the United States and on 4 May 1970, violence 
between students and National Guardsmen at Kent State University in Ohio resulted in killing 
deaths and nine injuries. Ten days later, police killed two protestors and injured twelve during a 
clash at Jackson State College in Mississippi. Historian Gregory Daddis writes, “The violence 
                                                            
21 Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia,” 30 April 1970. Online by the 
University of Virginia Miller Center, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/april-30-1970-
address-nation-situation-southeast-asia (hereafter, Nixon, 30 April TV address). 
22 Lewis Sorley writes, “The raid into Cambodia probably had – at this late date in the war, and given the limitations 
placed on it – only ephemeral effect,” but later argues that the “war was won” in late 1970. Lewis Sorley, A Better 
War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace 
& Company, 1999), 213 and 217. On the more critical side, Gregory Daddis argues in 2011 that “the incursion was 
not in fact a success by any rational standard of judgment,” and in 2017 that “Nixon’s decision to expand the war 
into Cambodia appeared the embodiment of unintended (and horrific) consequences.” Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure 
Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford UP, 2011), 211. 
Gregory A. Daddis, Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam (New York: Oxford UP, 2017), 
130. Others, such as Melvin Small and Andrew Wiest, acknowledge that the operation may have successfully 
delayed large-scale NVA attacks, but remain critical of claims of success. Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard 
Nixon (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 81. Andrew Wiest, Vietnam’s Forgotten Army: Heroism 
and Betrayal in the ARVN (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 198. 
23 Willbanks, 20. Black, 668-670. 
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and social unrest on the nation’s college campuses, in fact, underscored the interlocking nature of 
the war in Southeast Asia and the turbulent American home front in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.”24 Concurrent with this backlash against the administration within academic institutions 
was another within Congress. 
A month after the incident at Kent State, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution proposed by 
Kentucky Republican John Sherman Cooper and Idaho Democrat Frank Church that would cut 
funding for U.S. ground troops in Cambodia and Laos starting 30 June 1970.25 This did not pass 
the House of Representatives at the time. However, Congress passed a diluted version that 
prohibited any U.S. ground troops outside of South Vietnam in January 1971. This restriction 
significantly altered how Lam Son 719 was fought. In addition, the Cooper-Church Amendment 
signaled the beginning of Congress taking steps to regain power from the executive branch to 
end the war. 
While all of these events were occurring, Henry Kissinger had been holding periodic 
negotiations with the DRV in secret since 1969. These were convened in parallel to the public 
peace negotiations in Paris headed by former U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot 
Lodge. On 7 September 1970, as usual, Kissinger met North Vietnamese negotiator Xuan Thuy 
at a simple house in the Parisian suburbs. Kissinger pressed for a negotiated settlement, using the 
threat that the South Vietnamese were only getting stronger with time. Over the next few 
months, Hanoi would publicly reject entreaties from the United States, including a 7 October 
speech from President Nixon offering: a cease-fire, a peace conference, the negotiation of a 
timetable for total U.S. troop withdrawal, a political settlement for South Vietnam, and the 
mutual release of prisoners-of-war. Believing that nothing short of unilateral U.S. withdrawal 
                                                            
24 Daddis, Withdrawal, 129. 
25 Black, 680. 
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from South Vietnam would appease the North Vietnamese, Kissinger recalled that he and Nixon 
pursued a strategy of “three concurrent efforts until Saigon could stand on its own feet: 
American troop withdrawals, the rapid strengthening of South Vietnamese forces; and the 
progressive weakening of the enemy.”26 It is under this context that Nixon embarked upon 
Operation Lam Son 719. 
 By late 1970, Nixon wanted a big play to force the DRV to negotiate a truce, prove 
Vietnamization was working, and accelerate the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The Cambodian 
incursion drained DRV resources but not enough. Time was not on Nixon’s side. Due to the 
president’s April 1970 troop withdrawal promise and Congressional pressure on the military 
budget, MACV would lose another 60,000 troops by May 1971. Coupled with time windows 
dependent on monsoon seasons, this last play had to be conducted before May 1971.27 With the 
“when” decided, it was now a question of “where.”28 
 The exact origin of the plan to attack the NVA in Laos remains unclear. Due to the 
operation’s eventual failure, many of the decision-makers avoided responsibility after the fact. 
Nixon, Kissinger, and the South Vietnamese later blamed General Creighton Abrams, MACV’s 
commander. However, Abrams’ predecessor, General Westmoreland, proposed a similar plot 
four years earlier, which the Johnson White House abandoned. ARVN leaders had been 
proposing a similar attack since 1965. Abrams scholar Lewis Sorley describes Lam Son 719 as 
“stimulated by Washington, transmitted by McCain and Abrams, and sketched out by Thieu.” 
                                                            
26 Kissinger detailed in his memoirs that Hanoi would undercut any progress in the secret negotiations with public 
statements. As an example, Kissinger’s 7 September conversation with Xuan Thuy about the terms of a negotiated 
settlement was undercut by Hanoi’s issuance of “Madame Binh’s Eight-Point Peace Plan” ten days later, without 
any prior warning to Kissinger. Kissinger, White House Years, 976-981, 986. 
27 Willbanks, 29. 
28 Lam Son 719 would be the first public invasion of Laos supported by the United States. However, the U.S. had 
been running covert operations in Laos since the Johnson Administration. By 1971, these operations were overseen 
by the “40 Committee,” chaired by Henry Kissinger. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume 
VII, Vietnam, July 1970 - January 1972, eds. David Goldman, Erin Mahan, and Edward C. Keefer (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 2010) (hereafter, FRUS, Volume VII), Document 172. 
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John Prados explains, “The White House maneuvered to have Saigon take responsibility for what 
it wanted, both to stymie opponents and to avoid blame if things went wrong.” Post-operation 
finger pointing notwithstanding, it is likely that Nixon and Kissinger were the geneses. 
Eventually, the Pentagon devised the plan and communicated the idea to decision-makers in 
South Vietnam, including MACV, the U.S. Embassy, and the South Vietnamese. All the while, 
the White House actively tried to make it appear like a Vietnamese idea.29  
The resulting plan was to be conducted in four phases over three months. During Phase 
One—also called Dewey Canyon II to confuse the enemy by using codenames from an older 
operation—U.S. ground troops would secure Route 9 on the South Vietnamese side, from Khe 
Sanh to the Laotian border. This American-led phase would secure the area for ARVN ground 
troops and U.S. support troops to gather for the next phase. In Phase Two, ARVN troops, with 
U.S. air support, would cross into Laos, and proceed 42 kilometers up Route 9 to Tchepone, an 
important North Vietnamese base in Laos that had been the target of American policymakers 
since 1960.30 The ARVN would set up firebases along the route as they progressed. During 
Phase Three, ARVN would maintain control of Tchepone while conducting search-and-destroy 
missions along Trail routes surrounding Tchepone. Phase Four would be a withdrawal back to 
South Vietnam through a different route, going southeast through the A Shau Valley. The 
operation, named Lam Son 719 after the birthplace of a fifteenth-century Vietnamese hero, 
would be run by the South Vietnamese with support from the Americans. The objective was to 
                                                            
29 Sorley, A Better War, 234. John Prados, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975 (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 2009), 406. Other scholars such as Willbanks, Wiest, and General Bruce Palmer also 
support the theory that the idea originated from Nixon and Kissinger. Willbanks, 30. Wiest, 199. General Bruce 
Palmer, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington, KY: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1984), 106. In a 22 December 1970 meeting with Henry Kissinger, Joint Chiefs Chairman Moorer states 
that Gen. Abrams selected the Tchepone area “because it contains many lucrative targets.” FRUS, Volume VII, 
Document 93. 
30 Neil Sheehan, “Tchepone, in Laos Jungle, Long a Strategic Center,” The New York Times, 12 January 1972. 
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block the enemy’s flow of supplies and destroy stockpiles and facilities.31 Unfortunately for the 
Americans and South Vietnamese, the operation did not go as planned. 
Phase One began on 30 January 1971 and the ARVN crossed the border into Laos to 
begin Phase Two on 8 February. However, just a few days into the march up Route 9 towards 
Tchepone, the South Vietnamese became overwhelmed and the operation bogged down. Phases 
Three and Four would not be executed as planned. This was due to a combination of intelligence 
leaks, divergent goals between Nixon and Thieu, leadership failures in the upper ARVN 
echelons, poor weather delaying American air support, insufficient air support, as well as other 
factors. Encountering stiff resistance from the enemy, the column of ARVN soldiers stalled on 
Route 9 for weeks, giving the NVA time to regroup. By 20 February, some ARVN soldiers 
began retreating from their firebases in Laos.32  
Journalist Henry Kamm wrote in a 30 January 1990 New York Times article, “Tchepone 
became to many American and South Vietnamese military leaders what Moby Dick was to 
Captain Ahab – the object of an obsessive, destructive quest.”33 In early March 1971, the ARVN 
made another push and eventually “captured” Tchepone on 8 March, a Pyrrhic victory as the 
NVA had abandoned the city. The ARVN left almost as soon as they entered.34 By mid-March, 
only one month after first crossing into Laos, the South Vietnamese began their retreat. While 
most ARVN soldiers returned to South Vietnam on foot or aboard armored vehicles, the only 
way to evacuate some ARVN soldiers from Laotian bases was through U.S. helicopters. As 
helicopters arrived to pick up the wounded, some unwounded ARVN soldiers “panicked,” to use 
                                                            
31 Willbanks, 38-45; Prados, The Blood Road, 318. 
32 Prados, The Blood Road, 329-332. Willbanks, 165. Willbanks and other scholars attribute the stalling of the 
ARVN march up Route 9 in February 1971 to Thieu ordering a halt in operations to preserve the troops leading this 
operation, who also served as his anti-coup force in Saigon. Willbanks, 98. 
33 Henry Kamm, “On Ho Chi Minh Trail, New Villages and Old Bombs,” The New York Times, 30 January 1990. 
34 Prados, The Blood Road, 347. 
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Nixon’s characterization, and were photographed desperately clinging to helicopter skids.35 This 
enduring image, and the associated depiction of the ARVN as cowardly, dominated U.S. press 
coverage of Lam Son 719 from 18 March onwards.36 Traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail increased 
again shortly after the conclusion of Operation Lam Son 719.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
35 Nixon, RN, 498. 
36 The first images taken of ARVN soldiers clinging to skids of U.S. evacuation helicopters occurred as early as 20 
February with the evacuation of Ranger Base North. Willbanks, 98. However, this was before the short-lived bump 
in positive media coverage associated with the 8 March ARVN capture of Tchepone. President Nixon associates this 
image with the final withdrawal of ARVN troops from Laos on 18 March in his 1978 memoir and so this thesis, in 
analyzing administration reaction, will use the same timeline. Nixon, RN, 498. 
37 Willbanks, 162-163. 
 
 16 
Chapter 2: Press Coverage of Lam Son 719 
“Our worst enemy seems to be the press.”38 President Nixon’s well-documented and 
tumultuous relationship with the press, as exemplified by this comment to Henry Kissinger in 
early March of 1971, began before Nixon became president and never improved. Journalist Jack 
Anderson claimed that Nixon’s animosity towards the press dated back to his days as a 
congressman in the 1940s. Nixon blamed his 1960 presidential election loss to Kennedy on 
Anderson’s revelation of a loan from businessman Howard Hughes to Nixon’s brother.39 This 
hostility carried over to members of Nixon’s cabinet. Referring to Henry Kissinger and Secretary 
of State William Rogers during the late 1971 conflict between India and Pakistan, Anderson 
wrote that they “deliberately misled the reporters they saw…they lied because the President 
wanted them to lie.”40 During Lam Son 719, this long-standing battle between the president and 
the media was exacerbated by policies, personalities, and a history distinct to the Nixon 
Administration.  
On 29 January 1971, the day before beginning Phase One of the operation, MACV 
instituted a press embargo.41 The ban prohibited journalists from reporting on any actions in 
                                                            
38 Nixon quoted in Hammond, 460. 
39 Jack Anderson, The Anderson Papers (New York: Random House, 1973), 15-17. Lori Cox Han also writes that 
Nixon “brought to the White House a long and difficult relationship with the national press corps that dated back to 
the earliest days of his political career.” Han notes that Anderson was on a Nixon White House list of reporters 
deemed unfavorable to the administration. Lori Cox Han, Advising Nixon: The White House Memos of Patrick J. 
Buchanan (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2019), 57-58. Anderson is also listed on a “Bad Guys List” 
that White House staff circulated on 9 March 1971. Memorandum; Joanne L. Gordon/George T. Bell; 9 March 
1971. Folder Alpha Name Files (1969-1973) Charles Colson March 1971 [2 of 6]; Box 81; White House Special 
Files: Staff Member Office Files: H.R. Haldeman; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, 
California (hereafter referred to as Nixon Library).  
40 Anderson, 7-8. Anderson is not specific about the India/Pakistan conflict itself in his memoir. However, more 
detail about America’s role in the conflict was publicized in 2013 with the declassification of files from the time. 
Pankaj Mishra, “Unholy Alliances: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Bangladesh genocide,” The New Yorker, 23 September 
2013.  
41 While Lewis Sorley’s collection of MACV command meetings does not address whether this embargo was an 
order from the White House or Abrams’s idea, Abrams is steadfast in his belief that the embargo is necessary for 
operational security. On 30 January, in response to a Washington request to partially lift the embargo, Sorley quotes 
Abrams as saying, “The answer to this is no. The sole purpose of this is military security…and lift it a little bit – 
that’s more of that being a little bit pregnant…you either got to have the guts to stand and take the pummeling or, 
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Military Region I, the northernmost of South Vietnam’s four military regions, which included all 
of Lam Son 719’s operational areas.42 The only information cleared for publication was that 
provided by the MACV press office in a daily press statement. In a sign of MACV’s 
hypersensitivity to press leaks, a military spokesman’s 29 January statement explaining the 
embargo clarified that the restriction covered the statement itself. Nonetheless, the embargo did 
not last long. On 1 February, the New York Times reprinted a story from the London Observer 
that violated the embargo by reporting on MACV’s background briefing and speculating about 
an upcoming invasion into Laos.43 Rather than prevent leaks about the upcoming invasion, the 
policy appeared to have only further upset members of the media who felt the blackout was 
unjustified. MACV eventually lifted the embargo on 4 February. William Hammond speculates 
that it may have been the “bad blood” festering for months between MACV and the press which 
caused Abrams to hold the embargo for that long, despite General Abrams’ statements to the 
contrary. MACV was also contending with an order from the president to quietly restrict 
reporters’ access to military helicopters.44 This hostile environment would set the tone for press 
coverage of Operation Lam Son 719. 
In 1971, the combined circulation of United States newspapers that year reached over 62 
million per day. Many articles were shared across papers, as the Associated Press and United 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
goddamn it, you shouldn’t be in the business.” Lewis Sorley, ed., Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes 1968-
1972 (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2004), 525.  
42 Each of these four regions was assigned a military corps with a corresponding number. ARVN’s I Corps oversaw 
Lam Son 719. 
43 Hammond, 409. Willbanks, 71. Hammond, 413. 
44 Hammond notes that the MACV-press relationship had gotten so bad that reporters and military press officers had 
physical altercations, such as that which closed the press center in Da Nang. Hammond, 421. However, in meeting 
transcripts, Abrams appeared quite reasonable about his understanding of the tradeoff inherent in the embargo. He 
conceded in a 30 January meeting that the embargo comes at the “price” of MACV having to brief the media on 
details that they would not otherwise access during normal circumstances. Sorley, Vietnam Chronicles, 529. 
Admiral Moorer wrote in a 12 February diary entry, “The President wants to be sure that no American television or 
news correspondents ride on American helicopters. The President also wants to start discouraging the South 
Vietnamese from taking them on board their helicopters. We should clamp down on it slowly so that it does not 
become too obvious.” FRUS, Volume VII, Document 127. 
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Press International supplied stories to 1,750 American newspapers daily. The three television 
stations on the air at the time—NBC, ABC, and CBS—reached 51 million viewers per night. The 
most popular weeklies— Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report—reached 38 million 
readers per week. Radio news reached 9 million listeners per day.45 As a representation of the 
media landscape from mid-March to 7 April 1971, this thesis will explore in detail the three most 
popular weeklies—Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News—and three highly-circulated newspapers—
The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal—with the aim of 
tracking press coverage of Lam Son 719. 
Of the three weeklies, political scientist Lori Cox Han describes Time and Newsweek as 
“among the top targets for what the White House considered their ‘Eastern establishment,’ 
traditionally Democratic, bias.”46 Throughout four issues, from 15 March to 5 April, both Time 
and Newsweek initially remained neutral on Lam Son 719 and highlighted the heroism of U.S. 
forces. By 29 March, however, both weeklies had become negative about Lam Son 719 and 
vocal about the administration’s soured relationship with the press. Criticism of the 
administration, though, permeated throughout. 
With Lam Son 719 still in progress, the 15 March issue of Time withheld judgment on the 
operation and its effect on the U.S. withdrawal. In its regular section titled “The Nation,” Time’s 
journalists wrote, “perhaps, just perhaps, the U.S. may be able to pull off not only a successful 
withdrawal from Indochina but some form of victory as well…. The President had a valid point 
when he warned against too-quick judgments on Laos.” In the same issue, the weekly noted that 
truck movements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail had been halved thanks to Lam Son but due to 
                                                            
45 The Pew Research Center calculates the weekday circulation for daily newspapers in the United States in 1971 to 
be 62,231,000. Michael Barthel, “Newspapers Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center (Accessed on 18 September 2019, 
https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers). Landers, 2. 
46 Han, 58. 
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questions surrounding U.S. air support, victory “remains to be seen.”47 The 22 March issue was 
less optimistic about Lam Son 719, noting that traffic on the Trail had returned to normal.48 The 
article also called Lam Son “dispiriting” for the ARVN.49 Time acknowledged the toll the 
operation must have taken on the NVA in their coverage of Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai’s trip 
to Hanoi. In an article titled “Killing Is Our Business and Business Is Good,” Time 
correspondents wrote flattering descriptions of U.S. Army helicopter pilots while mentioning 
less-than-heroic actions by ARVN troops.50  
By 29 March, Time’s reporters were calling Lam Son 719 a retreat. A 29 March article, 
“Laos: The Bloody Battle to Get Out,” referred to ARVN soldiers clinging to helicopter skids in 
retreat and quoted a U.S. soldier referring to the ARVN with sarcasm, “Here come the victors.” 
The same article explained that of the 500 men in the ARVN’s 4th battalion who entered Laos, 
only 32 survived, of which one-third were wounded. In another offering titled “Was It Worth 
It?” Time’s authors predicted Lam Son’s failure to achieve the goals of delaying NVA 
                                                            
47 “The President Defends a Policy and a Man,” Time, The Nation, 15 March 1971. “Showdown in Laos,” Time, 15 
March 1971.  
48 The Time article did not specify the source of this trail traffic claim. “Shadowboxing,” Time, 22 March 1971. 
However, James Willbanks and Kissinger’s Deputy Security Advisor, Alexander Haig, also supported the notion 
that Ho Chi Minh Trail traffic returned to normal after a temporary lull during Lam Son. Willbanks cites electronic 
sensors on the trail while Haig quoted American pilots in his memoir. Willbanks, 163. Alexander Haig, Inner 
Circles: How America Changed the World, A Memoir (New York: Warner Books, 1992), 278. While not addressing 
post-Lam Son trail traffic specifically, DIA and CIA analyses in late March 1971 stated that trail input remained the 
same as the year before, to the consternation of Kissinger and his NSC staff. Memorandum; K. Wayne Smith/Henry 
Kissinger 18 March 1971. Folder Intelligence on NUSM 3-18-71; Box H-080; National Security Council (NSC) 
Institutional (“H”) Files: Meeting Files (1969-1974): Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) Meetings; Nixon 
Library. Referring to trail traffic on 20 March, Kissinger wrote to Nixon that “Lam Son was never intended to stop 
the movement of trucks,” and argued that because the NVA were restricted to the Laotian portion of the trail for 
supplies, as compared to 1970 when they also had sea routes from Cambodia, and that many of those supplies were 
going to troops in Laos fighting in Lam Son, the ultimate flow of supplies to South Vietnam was significantly 
reduced. FRUS, Volume VII, Document 159. 
49 Agreeing with Time on ARVN morale was former ARVN general Nguyen Duy Hinh, who wrote in an analysis 
for the U.S. Army that the ARVN were like prey for the NVA during this period, that the withdrawal “surely did not 
proceed as planned in an orderly and controlled manner,” and that leaving dead and wounded behind in Laos created 
an unending “horrendous trauma” for soldiers’ families. Maj. General Nguyen, 113, 118, 139-140. On the other 
hand, Ambassador Bunker characterized the South Vietnamese mood in a cable to Henry Kissinger on 24 March as 
“one of pride in the accomplishments of ARVN and confidence in its ability.” Cable; Ellsworth Bunker/Henry 
Kissinger 24 March 1971. Folder Vietnam 11 Feb 71 to 28 Mar 71 [3 of 3]; Box 153; National Security Council 
(NSC) Files: Vietnam Country Files; Nixon Library. 
50 “Killing Is Our Business and Business Is Good,” Time, 22 March 1971. 
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offensives, proving Vietnamization, building ARVN morale, and building political support for 
Thieu and Nixon. This 29 March issue also addressed a shift in White House communications 
strategy to push the president’s “human side.” 51 The narrative of a bloody ARVN retreat 
pervaded Time’s 5 April issue. A photo of an ARVN soldier hanging onto a helicopter skid 
appeared in an article titled “Again, the Credibility Gap?” Reporters called ARVN losses 
“numbing” and wrote that results for Vietnamization were “both encouraging and dismaying.” 
The increasing animosity between the White House and the press also featured in the issue. Time 
staff supported the president of NBC’s letter to all members of Congress condemning the 
administration’s discrediting and intimidation of news organizations, as well as NBC news 
anchor John Chancellor’s rare on-air rebuke of the administration. Responding to Nixon’s 
allegations during his 22 March television interview of biased coverage of Lam Son 719, Time’s 
writers argued, “Almost no reporters…were permitted to cover the operation inside Laos 
anyhow, so the President in effect was criticizing the press for not entirely accepting the official 
version of the story.”52 
Newsweek’s coverage from 15 March to 7 April largely mirrored that of Time. Its 15 
March cover story, “The Helicopter War,” consisted of articles presenting U.S. pilots in a heroic 
light. Joseph Morgenstern profiled Sgt. Dennis Fujii, who gave up his helicopter seat to a 
wounded ARVN and called airstrikes from Laos. Another correspondent, who experienced a 
rescue first-hand, highlighted a unit nicknamed the “Comancheros.” Another journalist agreed 
with Nixon that “the jury is still out” on Laos, but stressed that the two main issues in the 
president’s 1972 re-election bid will be the Vietnam War and domestic economics. However, the 
                                                            
51“Laos: The Bloody Battle to Get Out,” Time, 29 March 1971. “Was It Worth It?” Time, 29 March 1971. “Pushing 
the Human Side,” Time, The Presidency, 29 March 1971. 
52 “Again, the Credibility Gap?” Time, The Presidency, 5 April 1971. “Indochina: The Invasion Ends,” Time, 5 April 
1971. “TV v. the Pentagon,” Time, 5 April 1971. “Again, the Credibility Gap?” Time, The Presidency, 5 April 1971. 
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15 March issue also included critiques of Henry Kissinger’s seemingly singular control over 
foreign policy and of a Pentagon briefing on Lam Son 719, during which a spokesman displayed 
a pipe that turned out to be from a previous operation.53 Newsweek’s 22 March issue also began 
raising questions about Lam Son 719. In their coverage of Premier Zhou En Lai’s trip to Hanoi, 
Newsweek reporters stressed the NVA’s “infinite capacity for pain.”54  
By 29 March, Newsweek also used the term “retreat.” An article titled “Slugging It Out” 
noted that “When the fighting died down, the ARVN troops seemed to be scurrying back toward 
their own border…it seemed more like a plain old-fashioned retreat.” The rest of the 29 March 
issue included pieces on the troubles awaiting Vietnam veterans upon their return home, the 
dilapidated state of the ARVN’s choppers that may have led to the death of Newsweek’s 
correspondent Francois Sully, and an opinion piece about the necessity of the draft.55 By 5 April, 
correspondents wrote of “a bitter new pass” in relations between the White House and the press. 
In an article titled “A Bleak Week for Richard Nixon,” journalists wrote that Lam Son 719’s 
“public imagery was irrevocably set by…the reports of decimated South Vietnamese units falling 
raggedly back under blistering enemy fire, of panicky ARVN soldiers clinging desperately to the 
skids of outbound U.S. helicopters, [and] of casualties estimated officially at 25 per cent and 
unofficially at up to 50.” By this time, the publication’s staff believed that “whether or not [Lam 
Son 719] is ultimately considered a success, the President has little choice but to act as though it 
were a triumph.” Addressing Nixon’s statement that he had never directly contacted media 
members to complain, Newsweek editors responded that while the president may not have made 
                                                            
53 Joseph Morgenstern, “Two Soldiers,” Newsweek, 15 March 1971. “‘Just Say It Was the Comancheros,’” 
Newsweek, 15 March 1971. “Mr. Nixon: ‘The Jury Is Still Out,’” Newsweek, 15 March 1971. This article on 
Kissinger included an illustration of Kissinger giving orders to Nixon while sitting in the president’s oval office 
chair. “Who’s Secretary of State?” Newsweek, 15 March 1971. “P.S. to a Briefing,” Newsweek, 15 March 1971. 
54 “An Infinite Capacity For Pain,” Newsweek, 22 March 1971.  
55 “Slugging It Out,” Newsweek, 29 March 1971. “The Vietnam Vet: ‘No One Gives a Damn,’” Newsweek, 29 
March 1971. “Saigon’s Choppers: A Crash Waiting To Happen,” Newsweek, 29 March 1971. Stewart Alsop, “Do 
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direct contact, “the fusillades directed by Mr. Nixon’s surrogates against TV journalism last 
week represented the most concerted attack on media since Vice President Spiro Agnew’s 
celebrated Des Moines speech seventeen months ago.”56 
U.S. News, a conservative publication that the White House viewed as “favorable to the 
administration,” published fewer total articles about Lam Son 719 and the Vietnam War in their 
issues from 15 March to 7 April as compared to Time and Newsweek.57 The articles that U.S. 
News did publish took a positive or at least neutral tone towards Lam Son and the administration, 
often including direct quotes from administration officials. While the topics and tone of U.S. 
News’s 15 March issue on Laos were similar to those of Time and Newsweek that week, U.S. 
News’s coverage would subsequently diverge from the other two weeklies. The author of 
“Struggle in Laos – Biggest Test Yet for South Vietnam,” wrote a neutral assessment of Lam 
Son 719: “So far the picture from Laos is mixed: not the smashing victory optimists were 
looking for – but not the defeat some pessimists were predicting.” U.S. News’s journalists also 
noted the infighting between Kissinger, Rogers, and Laird.58 However, in the following weeks, 
U.S. News would remain either supportive of the administration, or silent on the war, as 
compared to the other two weeklies. 
 Unlike in Time and Newsweek where Lam Son 719 dominated coverage on 22 March and 
29 March, there was almost no mention of the operation in U.S. News within those issues. The 22 
March publication included one small reference to the Senate’s discussions about “limiting the 
                                                            
56 This article also addressed the NBC president’s letters to Congress and John Chancellor’s on-air statement. “A 
Bleak Week for Richard Nixon,” Newsweek, 5 April 1971. “Assessing the Laos Situation,” Newsweek, 5 April 1971. 
“Nixon vs. the Media,” Newsweek, 5 April 1971. 
57 Han writes, “By mid-1970, White House staffers had compiled an extensive list of more than 200 journalists from 
television, radio, and print, and placed each into one of six categories: Friendly to Administration, Balanced to 
Favorable, Balanced, Unpredictable, Usually Negative, and Always Hostile. Those considered more favorable to the 
administration came from conservative publications, such as U.S. News and World Report, Business Week, and the 
Chicago Tribune.” Han, 58. 
58 “Struggle in Laos – Biggest Test Yet for South Vietnam,” U.S. News and World Report, 15 March 1971. U.S. 
News and World Report, Washington Whispers, 15 March 1971. 
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President’s warmaking powers.”59 The following week’s release discussed Secretary Rogers’ 
ease with numbers and place names in Laos during a recent press conference, which supposedly 
showed that “Kissinger is not the only man in town who is familiar with foreign affairs.” That 
issue also predicted, incorrectly, that “war headlines will get less prominence” as the ARVN 
move out of Laos in the weeks ahead. Other articles covered a survey of Americans’ feelings 
about the Vietnam War and addressed problems facing Vietnam veterans.60 
U.S. News’s 5 April issue devoted much more coverage to Laos and the war. An 
interview with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer, consisted mainly 
of administration talking points. In “Balance Sheet on Laos – Victory or Defeat,” the writer 
argued, “Results fell far short of the ‘big victory’ that was hoped for, but were far from the 
‘defeat’ Hanoi is claiming.” “President Nixon is now in a position, as a result of the Laos 
incursion, to announce in mid-April a fresh withdrawal of American ground troops from South 
Vietnam,” the author concluded. The article also depicted ARVN performance as “mixed but 
basically encouraging to Saigon,” and quoted a U.S. military officer as saying, “Saigon has 
scored a partial success – but an expensive one.” Of note is the article’s photo: ARVN orderly 
awaiting a helicopter pickup, as opposed to hanging on helicopter skids.61 
Newspaper coverage from 18 March to 7 April generally echoed that of Time and 
Newsweek, starting with more measured assessments before becoming more critical of the 
Laotian operation and the Nixon administration. On 18 March, the New York Times, The 
Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal all devoted front-page articles to Lam Son 719 
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and all took a neutral view.62 Among the three publications, the Times took a slightly negative 
tone in its initial coverage and became decidedly negative around 22 March, which is seen most 
markedly in Saigon Bureau Chief Alvin Shuster’s articles. The Post remained more neutral in the 
operation’s first week, bifurcated into staunchly pro-administration and anti-administration 
articles the second week, before returning to a neutral position by the third week. The Journal 
devoted the least amount of coverage to Lam Son 719, though what it did write was negative.63 
Most of its reporting on Laos during this period consisted of one paragraph per day in its front-
page “What’s News” summary section. Considering the Nixon administration’s lumping of the 
Times and Post into their “Eastern Establishment” list along with Time and Newsweek, it is 
surprising that the Post devoted considerable space to official statements while the Journal did 
not hold back on criticisms.64 
The New York Times generally trended negatively compared to the other two papers but 
became much more critical beginning on 22 March. Coverage on or before 21 March 
acknowledged the difficulties that the ARVN faced and the incongruity between battlefield 
accounts and official statements. However, Times authors refrained from judging the operation a 
failure. On 18 March, although the Times published a photo of an ARVN soldier hanging onto a 
U.S. helicopter skid and called him a “hitchhiker,” the article retained its objectivity and called 
the situation a “pull out.” In that same issue, Alvin Shuster called the fighting “bitter” and quoted 
a South Vietnamese “associate” of President Thieu as saying that “Nixon will be able to claim it 
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was all a success and thus American boys can go home sooner.”65 Around the same time, James 
Naughton quoted Vice President Agnew as calling Lam Son “an orderly retreat,” and another 
journalist quoted Pentagon spokesman Jerry Friedheim as saying that the operation was going 
“according to plan.”66 Robert B. Semple wrote about this diverging narrative on 19 March: 
“Caught between the optimistic comments by the Administration, and the pessimistic but 
fragmentary details from the field, many observers…conceded uncertainty about the course of 
the Laotian operation.” By 21 March, Shuster was still asking whether Lam Son 719 was “a 
triumph or a trap.”67  
The next day, however, after 2,000 more ARVN troops returned from Laos, Shuster 
wrote that the “withdrawal…seemed to observers here to come earlier than expected, because of 
the relentless enemy opposition.” He called Saigon’s latest estimate of captured munitions 
“questionable at best.”68 By 24 March, the bureau chief used the words “losers” and “defeated,” 
though qualifying the terms, while another article slammed Nixon’s “credibility gap.”69 In an 
article that prompted General Abrams to write an explanatory memo to the White House, Gloria 
Emerson quoted an ARVN corporal as saying, “The papers and the radio in Saigon kept on 
saying there was a Laos victory, I have learned now, but what a joke…. We ran out like 
                                                            
65 “Saigon’s Forces Quit Fourth Base in Laos Fighting,” The New York Times, 18 March 1971. Alvin Shuster, “U.S. 
Copters Lift 1,000 out of Laos; Fighting Is Bitter,” The New York Times, 18 March 1971. Alvin Shuster, “Thieu, 
facing election, sees political gains in Laos drive,” The New York Times, 18 March 1971.  
66 James M. Naughton, “Agnew Says U.S. Would Acknowledge a Laos Defeat,” The New York Times, 20 March 
1971. “‘According to plan,’ U.S. Says,” The New York Times, 18 March 1971.  
67 Robert B. Semple, “U.S. Cites Gains in Laos Amid Reports of Setbacks,” The New York Times, 19 March 1971. 
Alvin Shuster, “Is the Laos Campaign a Triumph or a Trap?” The New York Times, 21 March 1971. 
68 Alvin Shuster, “2,000 Retreat from Laos, Pursued by Hanoi Units; U.S. Planes Bomb in North,” The New York 
Times, 22 March 1971. 
69 Alvin Shuster wrote, “The allies are coming out looking like losers, whether they are or not,” and that “the image 
projected of a defeated South Vietnamese Army is likely to remain.” Alvin Shuster, “The Campaign in Laos: Early 
Assessment Indicates That Hanoi Won at Least a Propaganda Victory,” The New York Times, 24 March 1971. 
“…Increases the Credibility Gap,” The New York Times, 24 March 1971. 
 
 26 
wounded dogs.”70 In the following days, criticism of the operation turned toward the 
administration. In a “letter to the editor” published on 27 March, one reader predicted that if 
Nixon tried to call Lam Son a success, he would lose re-election.71 On 28 March, James Reston, 
one of the president’s “bad guys,” wrote that Nixon’s “main problem is not with his personality 
or with the press, formidable as these problems are, but with his policies on the war and the 
economy.”72 That same day, Alvin Shuster saw “no doubt here that the President would have 
proceeded with the withdrawals no matter what happened in Laos. Politically, he would seem to 
have no choice.”73 
This criticism of the administration would also lead to criticisms of Vietnamization. On 5 
April, Anthony Lewis wrote in the Times that the lesson of Laos was that “Vietnamization is 
now seen to have limited possibilities.” The next day, Don Luce contended that a negotiated 
political compromise was the only solution that could end the war, while an editorial argued, 
“Continued claims of success for the Laotian invasion and the Vietnamization program – and the 
contradictory policy of seeking military victory while American troops are withdrawing – will 
only tempt the South Vietnamese further down the path to disaster and intensify the highly 
emotional divisions at home.”74 
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In mid-March, similar to the Times’ coverage, The Washington Post also withheld 
judgment of the operation. Correspondents acknowledged the difficulties in balancing anecdotal 
accounts from the front with official statements from Saigon and Washington. A front-page 
article on 18 March quoted a U.S. helicopter pilot as saying, “from where I’m flying there’s only 
one way to describe it [the ARVN withdrawal from Laos] – retreat, and a bad one.” The same 
article quoted a South Vietnamese spokesman who argued that the move was “tactical,” and 
repeated Pentagon spokesman Friedheim’s statement that the operation was proceeding 
“according to plan.”75 The following day, Post correspondent Peter Jay seemed unprepared to 
make a final assessment. “At this point, it seems likely that no real evaluation of Lam Son 
719…will be possible until well after the operation is over and the troops have been 
withdrawn.”76  
During the week from 21 to 28 March, the tone of articles in the Post diverged markedly 
into two camps: pro- and anti-administration. Leading the pro-Lam Son/administration camp was 
conservative columnist Joseph Alsop. On 22 March, Alsop argued that the “reasons for Saigon’s 
decision to begin withdrawal are both obvious and sound.” Two days later, when many were 
questioning the retreat, he still declared that “optimism is in order.” On 26 March, Alsop 
defended Nixon and questioned the media’s propagation of a “credibility gap.”77 Though not as 
supportive as Alsop, Jack Foisie still called the situation an “orderly withdrawal” in a 24 March 
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article, while the day before, Chalmers Roberts and Peter Jay both gave the official version of 
events by quoting directly from Nixon’s ABC television interview and ARVN briefers.78 
In direct contrast to Alsop, another Nixon “bad guy,” Joseph Kraft, led the Post’s anti-
Lam Son/administration camp. “It is more than ever doubtful,” he wrote on 21 March, “that the 
South Vietnamese can defend themselves without substantial American help.”79 Two days later, 
Kraft criticized Nixon’s escalation of the war while claiming to accelerate withdrawals. “With 
the goal of getting out proclaimed, there is no credible logic for expanding military activities…. 
The President can no longer take the country in tow on Vietnam simply by saying Forward 
March.”80 Peter Osnos, Peter Jay, and Chalmers Roberts each wrote pieces at the month’s end 
criticizing the ARVN’s retreat from Laos and describing the Nixon administration’s 
difficulties.81 
 However, from 29 March to 7 April, the Post’s coverage returned to the neutral center. 
Most articles about Lam Son 719 tended to analyze the administration’s next steps with the 
perspective of political realities. On 29 March, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak believed it 
was “impossible to offset highly emotionalized accounts of the fighting that dominate the media 
with immediate evidence of military success.”82 On 1 April, David Broder offered his pragmatic 
take: “If South Vietnam can get through this year with its territory relatively secure, and if Mr. 
Thieu can be re-elected in a relatively honest election, then the stage would be set for Mr. Nixon 
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to adopt George Aiken’s long-standing advice to ‘declare victory and get out.’”83 On 5 April, 
Marquis Childs claimed that the “objectives of the Laos operation were 75 to 80 per cent 
achieved.” Childs also provided some insight into the administration’s plan for the 7 April 
address, writing that the president’s advisors “know the country is being torn apart not only by 
the war but by all the dire events of the decade of the ‘60s.”84 
Although the Wall Street Journal had the least coverage of Lam Son 719 among the three 
papers, the articles it did publish from 18 March to 7 April were negative about the operation and 
remained so throughout the period. Peter Kann struck a measured tone for his front-page story on 
18 March. “Despite the ARVN retreats of recent days, military officials in Vietnam believe they 
already have seriously disrupted the North Vietnamese army supply line and thus the enemy’s 
future plans.” Writers of the Journal’s “What’s News” section on 19 March labeled the operation 
a “retreat” and the issue’s “Washington Wire” section predicted the “results in Laos will be less 
than Washington wanted, though officials will claim successes.” On 24 March, Robert Keatley 
questioned the White House’s official statements and assumptions but wrote that the White 
House “seems honestly to believe” in Vietnamization and value of Lam Son 719.85 
On 26 March, John Pierson attributed Nixon’s public optimism to either a lie to “disguise 
real uneasiness,” or the White House being “isolated from reality.” Three days later, Peter Kann 
and Richard Levine questioned the administration’s motives. “Troop withdrawals – pegged more 
to political pressures in the States than to military realities in Indochina – will doubtless 
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continue, or even accelerate, as they probably would have whether the Laos operation had ended 
in a clearcut victory or defeat.”86 
During this period, the Journal devoted significant space to covering political challenges 
to Nixon’s policies, such as calls by Democratic Senators Mike Mansfield and Ted Kennedy to 
end the war, as well as Republican Congressman Pete McCloskey’s demands for transparency 
during his trip to Vietnam.87 Other articles discussed the shift in domestic political sentiment 
with the failure of Laos. Norman Miller quoted a Democratic congressman on 31 March, who 
argued that “people are just too angry about the war for there to be a political risk in opposing 
the President.” Quoting another congressman, Miller continued, “There’s an increasing demand 
to get out of Vietnam regardless of the consequences.”88 The Journal’s 7 April “What’s News” 
summary, published the morning of Nixon’s television address, read, “There has been a swelling 
of sentiment in Congress to name a date for total withdrawal, and polls have shown Nixon’s 
popularity slipping.”89 
While a few publications, such as U.S. News and The Chicago Tribune, were more 
supportive of the administration’s claims of success in Lam Son 719, most other print and 
television media mirrored the negativity represented in Time, Newsweek, The New York Times, 
The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal.90 Even with restrictions imposed, journalists 
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found their way around them, such as Japanese photographer Akihiko Okamura on assignment 
with Life, who snuck into Laos for two weeks with ARVN troops. The resulting images and 
reporting, because of their scarcity, garnered attention and exacerbated the negative coverage.91  
 Television coverage often was more negative than print media. The high-profile spat 
between NBC and the White House in early April 1971, culminating in NBC President Julian 
Goodman’s letter to all members of Congress condemning the administration’s intimidation of 
news organizations and NBC news anchor John Chancellor’s unprecedented on-air criticism of 
the administration, epitomized this fractured relationship. The acrimony extended to other 
networks as well, such as when Vice President Agnew, on behalf of the administration, attacked 
CBS for their documentary “The Selling of the Pentagon,” which exposed the Pentagon’s public 
affairs budget and activities.92 For an administration that already distrusted the media, the press’s 
negativity towards the Laos operation appeared to be spoiling a success for Vietnamization and 
required a proactive response. 
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Chapter 3: The White House Response to Negativity towards Lam Son 719 
While the White House dealt with other competing international and domestic issues 
between 18 March and 7 April, Lam Son 719 remained at the forefront.93 Also, President Nixon 
took the systematic tracking of and response to media to an unprecedented level. Political 
scientist Lori Cox Han notes how the Nixon administration was the first to open a White House 
Communications Office, separate from the Press Office, to deal with long-term strategies. It was 
also the first administration to produce daily news summaries. “For better or worse,” Han points 
out, “Nixon’s advisors changed the way that the White House attempted to manage the image of 
the president as well as manage the press.”94 In one such news summary from 18 March, White 
House staff flagged an unflattering article from syndicated columnist and prominent member of 
the White House “Bad Guys List” James Reston in the Detroit Free Press. The president 
underlined a quote on the summary, “Nixon invaded Laos without a single word to the American 
people” and wrote a note to Henry Kissinger that Reston “should be nailed for this. Didn’t he 
object to ‘rhetoric’ of Cambodia?”95 Nixon closely tracked domestic media down to individual 
journalists, and directed staff to take specific, targeted action in response.  
By mid-March, the White House communications team became well aware of the 
increasingly negative press coverage of Lam Son 719. NSC staff described media reports as 
“gloomy and loud” and emotions at the White House as “widespread nervousness.”96 The 
administration had already begun promoting positive assessments of the situation in Laos among 
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Cabinet officials and Members of Congress.97 The increasingly antagonistic relationship between 
the administration and the press, which peaked during Lam Son, had escalated to the point where 
Nixon, Kissinger, and other staff were blaming the press for an anti-administration, even anti-
American, bias. During a 17 March telephone conversation, President Nixon fumed over “these 
smart son-of-a-bitching reporters. I really think some of them are trying to serve Hanoi now.” 
Kissinger agreed. “I believe they have a vested interest in our losing.”98 During another phone 
call with Kissinger two days later, Nixon retained his anger. “The press is panting so that they 
can make it [Lam Son 719] into a defeat.”99 For the administration, negative coverage of Lam 
Son was yet another example of the liberal press’s anti-Nixon bias, to which they had to respond 
with strength.100  
With negative reports streaming in, Nixon and Kissinger sent Deputy National Security 
Advisor Alexander Haig to South Vietnam from 14 to 21 March to get a first-hand read of the 
situation. Publicly, Kissinger wrote to Ambassador Bunker that the reason for the trip was “to 
provide a general assessment of the situation in Southeast Asia and to obtain [Bunker’s] views 
on a number of long range issues.” Privately, Nixon was considering firing Abrams, possibly 
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even replacing him with Haig.101 In his memoirs, Haig recalls two main conclusions based on his 
trip: “First, the South Vietnamese troops, though in some cases poorly led by their higher-
ranking officers, had fought bravely and performed well. Second, U.S. fire support and close air 
support had been inadequate.... This resulted in casualty rates among South Vietnamese troops 
that no American commander would have countenanced.” Kissinger later described Haig’s trip 
as putting “an end to all illusions” that the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces could still turn Lam 
Son into a success.102 
Upon arriving in Saigon, Haig met with Bunker and Abrams. His conversations with the 
ambassador and MACV commander included a maximum troop withdrawal number, guarding 
against leaks, and a possible meeting between Nixon and Thieu in July. Haig described Bunker 
as “enthusiastic and confident.”103 After returning from a day-trip to Cambodia, Haig visited I 
Corps, the one was responsible for Lam Son 719 of the ARVN’s four corps. This visit to the 
front convinced Haig that the best the United States could hope for by this point in the operation 
was an orderly withdrawal to avoid a complete failure. He reported that “ARVN enthusiasm for 
[the] continuation of Lam Son 719 is completely lacking” and apologized to Kissinger that he 
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could not give a “more encouraging report.”104 Haig’s meeting with President Thieu the next day 
appeared less pessimistic “I do not feel we need to be in the least defensive about Lam Son 719,” 
Haig reported back home. “It has achieved most of what we had hoped for and those involved 
here all are confident that it was well worth the price of admission – albeit a high one.” Thieu 
explained that his modifications to the original plan were due to the unexpected strength of the 
NVA and the ARVN’s heavy losses, and bemoaned “the great amount of pessimistic and 
distorted reporting which he attributed primarily to foreign reporters in South Vietnam.” Haig 
also sensed that local ARVN commanders would withdraw early, even if Thieu directed 
otherwise.105  
Though frustrating, the negative press reports should not have been surprising to the 
White House. In his 12 February diary entry, which described Nixon’s order to restrict media 
access to American and South Vietnamese helicopters, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral 
Moorer, explained the president’s fear of American households being exposed to “gory pictures” 
if “reporters and news men [are allowed to run] loose in the battle zone.”106 As these efforts, 
along with MACV’s press embargo, failed to dampen the media’s backlash, Nixon spent most of 
the three weeks from 18 March to 7 April dealing with the aftermath. 
While acknowledging that instances of panicking ARVN did occur, Nixon tried to shift 
focus to the ARVN units who withdrew orderly. On a 17 March phone call, Admiral Moorer 
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assured the president that media reports of ARVN “fleeing” a firebase in Laos were inaccurate, 
to which Nixon responded, “This is just a typical newspaper story.”107 Two days later, Nixon and 
Kissinger said that the majority of ARVN soldiers conducted themselves honorably, though both 
appeared to be more hopeful than factual. 
“Nixon: It seems to me they [ARVN] are doing very well. 
Kissinger: They are doing it in a very professional way. 
Nixon: No panicing [sic] or running. 
Kissinger: The other side is suffering very heavy losses too.”108  
 
The argument that panicking soldiers represented only a minority of ARVN troops translated 
into part of the messaging strategy for a television interview on 22 March with ABC network’s 
Howard K. Smith. 
The 22 March Interview 
A week before the Smith interview, Nixon received a letter from Private First Class 
Clyde Baker, a soldier stationed in South Vietnam who was supporting Lam Son 719. Using the 
analogy of a “cowboy backing out of a saloon with guns blazing,” Baker viewed the decision to 
embark upon Lam Son 719 as an honorable way to withdraw from the Vietnam War. He 
contrasted this with “walking out and getting shot in the back.” This letter from a junior soldier 
not only made it to the president’s desk but also apparently made a big enough impression for 
Nixon to write, “Excellent ltr! H [Haldeman] – can’t we get one like this out to a columnist?”109 
Themes from Baker’s letter, such as the good-guy, gunslinger mentality and the linking of Lam 
Son 719 to the greater effort to withdraw from Vietnam, eventually would extend into talking 
points for Nixon’s interview.  
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In a 20 March telephone call with Kissinger, Nixon said that he would focus “on the 
philosophy side” of the argument on Laos and instructed Kissinger not to “talk about victory or 
defeat,” but to focus on Lam Son’s contribution to Vietnamization.110 Calling Kissinger on the 
morning of the interview, Nixon latched onto a statistic from General Abrams that “4 of 22 
[ARVN divisions] were below par,” which he considered a “good average.” Nixon then 
reminded Kissinger that he “will be careful not to use victory or success so it won’t look like 
whistling in the dark.”111 
 The most consistent theme of Nixon’s 22 March interview was media bias. In a typical 
example, Nixon said, “It is probably true, that I have less, as somebody has said, supporters in 
the press than any president.” In addition to periodically returning to this theme, Nixon 
accomplished four main objectives in addressing Lam Son 719 during the interview. First, he 
avoided assessing the operation as either a victory or defeat by redefining success in terms of the 
greater Vietnam War. As Nixon reasoned, “We cannot judge it even after it is concluded.” 
Second, Nixon addressed the coverage of fleeing ARVN soldiers by attributing these actions to a 
small minority. “While a picture doesn’t lie, a picture may not tell all the truth…. They have 
shown only those men in the four ARVN battalions of 22 that were in trouble.” Third, Nixon 
took a long-term philosophical justification for the war. Addressing why he could not simply 
withdraw U.S. troops, he explained that if “the Communists took over South 
Vietnam…peace…would suffer a blow from which it might not recover.” Lastly, Nixon lowered 
expectations for the future. While the United States would try to end America’s involvement in 
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Vietnam in a way that ensures South Vietnam’s survival, he also cautioned, “We can’t guarantee 
their survival.” This was a telling admission and a significant shift from previous statements.112  
According to both the administration and media, the President did well. The day after the 
interview, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker told Kissinger that he heard that the 
interview was “very good—excellent,” and that the South Vietnamese people “are strongly 
supporting the action in Laos.” Nixon media consultants Mark Goode and Bill Carruthers wrote 
to Haldeman the same day that “the discussion itself went very well,” though they were not 
pleased with camera angles and lighting. H.R. Haldeman wrote in his diary the night of the 
interview that it “went extremely well on TV; staff reaction was very good.” The president’s 
words immediately became the updated talking points for Lam Son 719 throughout the various 
public affairs offices of the Departments of State and Defense.113 
Military historian William Hammond found that the “news media accepted Nixon’s claim 
that the final results of the incursion would become apparent only months in the future, making it 
a theme in the weeks that followed. They nevertheless questioned a number of the president’s 
other assertions.”114 Some of those questions came from The Washington Post’s Chalmers 
Roberts and The New York Times’s Robert Semple and Tom Wicker. The authors’ areas of doubt 
included Nixon’s troop withdrawal timeline, his suggestion of unfair media coverage, and his 
claims that an objective of Lam Son 719 was to save American lives.115 Each of the weeklies 
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also mentioned Nixon’s 22 March interview, though they focused more on the interview’s role in 
White House communication, and less on its content about Laos. Time portrayed the interview as 
part of a public relations “effort to show the President’s personal side.” Newsweek left open the 
possibility that time would prove Lam Son to have been “worthwhile,” but criticized Nixon’s on-
air claims that he has never contacted media to affect coverage. U.S. News and World Report, 
continuing its favorable coverage of the administration, chose to print seven paragraphs from the 
official White House transcript of the interview without further editorializing.116 In perhaps the 
most telling sign that the interview was a win for Nixon, interviewer Howard K. Smith said in 
1997 that he regretted not asking tougher questions and standing firmer against the president 
back in 1971.117 
The White House believed that the Smith interview successfully reframed the debate over 
Lam Son 719 enough to quell the media’s negative reports. During the following week, the 
Nixon team began to shift their message. On 24 March, Nixon told Kissinger, in preparation for 
Kissinger’s breakfast meeting with conservative journalist Stewart Alsop the next day, “You can 
be more off beat than I was. I never used success or victory but now we can say [Lam Son 719] 
was a success.” Nixon then explained his parameters for calling the operation a success: “in 
terms of their losses against ours and cut supplies and in terms of guarantee of American 
withdrawal and reducing threat and strengthening SVN [South Vietnamese] morale and 
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Vietnamization.”118 Through this seemingly casual brainstorming over the phone, Nixon outlined 
multiple strands of argument in favor of Lam Son, which would form the basis of the White 
House’s preparations over the next few weeks. These included: the operation’s support of a U.S. 
withdrawal, numbers of enemy killed, captured and wounded, numbers of enemy supplies 
captured or destroyed, reducing the North Vietnamese threat, strengthening of South Vietnamese 
morale, and Vietnamization. 
During the ABC interview, Nixon claimed that one benefit of Lam Son was that “the risk 
to American lives is substantially reduced, and that is why the support of that operation was 
worthwhile, in my opinion.” It seems likely that the president bet that the American public, while 
sympathetic to the South Vietnamese cause, cared more about their own fathers and sons. This 
was met with disapproval from the press. In a 23 March New York Times article, journalist Tom 
Wicker quoted an American pilot as saying that in at least one instance, to fly his helicopter, he 
had to kick clinging ARVN soldiers off of the skids. Wicker used this metaphor of pushing aside 
the South Vietnamese “so the American bird can fly” as an “epitaph of the Laotian invasion” and 
a criticism of President Nixon’s argument to save American lives.119 Nevertheless, the 
administration pushed the point—the operation was saving American lives because it allowed for 
U.S. troop withdrawals. 
Beginning a few months after taking office in 1969, President Nixon systematically drew 
down the number of U.S. combat troops in Vietnam. Before the Nixon administration, the 
number of authorized U.S. troops in Vietnam steadily increased for eight consecutive years, 
rising most dramatically from under 50,000 at the beginning of 1965 to a peak of nearly 550,000 
in April 1969. Through four separate announcements over 1969 and 1970, Nixon progressively 
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reduced troop numbers, reaching a promised cap of 284,000 by 1 May 1971.120 Similarly, 
combat deaths of U.S. troops in Vietnam, which increased before Nixon took office, declined 
from an average of 279 per week on 20 January 1969 to 46 per week by early 1971.121 A primary 
part of Nixon’s messaging after Lam Son was that the administration would continue this trend 
toward the American military’s ultimate departure from Vietnam.  
In a clear nod to the administration’s focus on troop numbers, White House and State 
Department staff referred to the president’s 7 April address as a “Troop Withdrawal Statement” 
in memos.122 No matter the outcome of Lam Son 719, President Nixon planned to use the 
incursion as an opportunity to announce another acceleration of troop withdrawals. That would 
be “proof” to the American people of success both in Laos and in Vietnamization. However, 
determining this final number would require the balancing of competing demands. On the one 
hand, the White House had an American public and a Congress insisting on the complete 
removal of U.S. troops as soon as possible. On the other, the South Vietnamese and U.S. military 
needed as many troops as possible to remain for as long as possible to ensure the security of 
South Vietnam.  
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One purpose of Alexander Haig’s March 1971 trip to Vietnam and Cambodia was to 
discuss troop numbers in detail on the ground.123 After his discussions with General Abrams on 
16 March, Haig questioned whether the White House and MACV plan, which had 60,000 U.S. 
troops remaining by 1 September 1972, would be sufficient. Although he felt 60,000 might be 
too low, Haig believed that maintaining a troop level between 60,000 and 90,000 in South 
Vietnam by 1 September 1972 was an “acceptable risk” given how far ARVN capabilities had 
progressed. On Haig’s recommendation, Kissinger passed this range to the president. This 
translated to a reduction of approximately 224,000 to 194,000 troops from 1 May 1971 to 1 
September 1972. Haig also pointed out that the United States “must be prepared to compensate 
with additional financial assistance” for the negative impact American base closures and reduced 
personnel would have on the South Vietnamese economy. In Ambassador Bunker’s words, the 
United States would be “trading millions for billions.” After his meeting with Haig, Abrams sent 
a memo to the Secretary of Defense with a recommendation to make four separate smaller 
announcements about withdrawal rates instead of one large announcement to “best preserve 
flexibility” and not provide the enemy with the “encouragement” that a large announcement 
might. Still, Abrams’ memo suggested removing 224,000 total troops by 1 September 1972. This 
represented an average of 14,000 troops per month but Abrams assumed that only one-third of 
these troops would be withdrawn in 1971.124 
                                                            
123 Discussion of troop withdrawals with Abrams is on the top of a list entitled “Items To Be Covered During Trip to 
Southeast Asia,” which Haig sent to Kissinger the day before his departure. Memo; Alexander Haig/Henry 
Kissinger; 13 March 1971; folder Haig SEA Trip March 14-21, 1971 [1 of 2]; Box 1013; NSC Files: Alexander M. 
Haig Special File; Nixon Library. 
124 Cable Draft; Haig/Kissinger, undated but the Abrams meeting occurred on the afternoon of 16 March 1971; 
folder Haig SEA Trip March 14-21, 1971 [1 of 2]; Box 1013; NSC Files: Alexander M. Haig Special File; Nixon 
Library. The cable draft containing Abrams’s recommendation of four separate announcements was also housed in 
the same folder, and was also undated. Haig also discussed troop withdrawals with Ambassador Bunker in a meeting 
on the same day. Bunker recommended that President Nixon announce a withdrawal of 30,000 troops for the short 
period from 1 May to 1 July 1971, with the thought that Presidents Nixon and Thieu meet in July. At that meeting, 
Thieu could announce that “he will no longer require U.S. ground forces” for security, but only “air and technical, 
logistics and intelligence support.” Cable Draft; Haig/Kissinger, undated but the Bunker meeting occurred on the 
 
 43 
By late March of 1971, the average withdrawal rate was 12,500 troops per month. If this 
“run rate” continued, the U.S. troop level in South Vietnam would fall to 221,500 by 1 October 
1971, and 87,500 total troops would depart between 1 May and 1 December 1971. Many in the 
press understood remarks from Nixon’s 22 March television interview to mean that he would, at 
a minimum, hold the run rate and would announce an end-date for the American presence in 
Vietnam during his April address.125 However, Nixon and Kissinger believed that they needed to 
announce not only a maintenance of the run rate but an acceleration just to hold American public 
opinion at bay. On the opposing side, President Thieu and the U.S. military imposed a ceiling on 
the number of personnel that could be sent home. The administration had promised Thieu, 
through Ambassador Bunker, that at least 200,000 U.S. troops would remain in South Vietnam 
through Thieu’s re-election bid on 7 October 1971. While this number was achievable under the 
run rate, a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to lower withdrawals to 8,000 per month for the 
rest of 1971 was not.126 
By 29 March, Nixon and Kissinger decided to increase the withdrawal rate to just over 
14,000 troops per month to total 100,000 troops to be removed from South Vietnam between 1 
May and 1 December 1971. This would preserve the troop level at just over 200,000 for Thieu’s 
re-election, and bring the total troop level down to 184,000 by 1 December. The president and 
Kissinger reasoned that the key to producing maximum positive reception from the public was to 
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keep the number a secret. In his dispatches back from South Vietnam, Alexander Haig already 
was reminding the president and Kissinger to be careful about leaks regarding withdrawal 
numbers. “Its premature surfacing,” he warned, “could have a disastrous effect on Thieu’s 
election chances and whole stability of [South Vietnam].” Haig thought that leaks could also 
deny Nixon a “major campaign coup” back at home.127  
The president worried about leaks regarding the withdrawal rate seriously enough to send 
a memo to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and CIA 
Director Richard Helms. The presidential directive warned their agencies that “there should be 
no speculation either on or off the record on the size of the increment or the length of time it 
covers.” This appeared to have been directed at Secretary Laird, who Nixon and Kissinger 
suspected of leaking to the press that the president would announce an increase to the withdrawal 
rate. During a heated phone call with Kissinger on 23 March, Laird also pushed for the president 
to announce a deadline for final withdrawal. Further illustrating Laird’s frayed relationship with 
the president and National Security Advisor, during a conversation in which Kissinger likened 
Laird to “a little boy with his hand in the cookie jar,” Nixon and Kissinger discussed feeding 
misinformation to Laird and asking him to pass that false information to the press. Even though 
Nixon already decided that he would announce an increase in the total withdrawal number to 
100,000 troops, he planned for Kissinger to tell Laird that the president intended to maintain the 
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lower run rate number of 87,500, ask Laird to pass this to the press, and inform Laird at the latest 
possible opportunity that the president “changed his mind.”128 This strategy of secrecy did not 
appear to prevent all leaks. On 2 April, NSC staffer Jon Howe excerpted an ABC TV news 
segment that quoted “White House sources” as predicting an acceleration of the withdrawal rate 
to 16,000, and even up to 20,000 per month, well above the run rate and even above the rate 
Nixon already planned to announce.129  
Other administration allies pushed for the president to announce a final deadline, 
believing that the focus on the withdrawal rate was futile in efforts to satisfy the public’s demand 
to end the war. NSC staffer W.R. Smyser, a former State Department diplomat, wrote to 
Kissinger that after a survey of members of Congress and Washington insiders, he believed that 
even a “substantial increase” in the withdrawal rate would neither help the president buy time 
nor would it increase domestic support. If Nixon was not yet prepared to announce a time limit, 
Smyser recommended that he explain why setting a deadline would harm U.S. interests. Echoing 
Smyser’s push for a total troop withdrawal, Senator John Sherman Cooper, co-author of the 
Cooper-Church Amendment, told Kissinger that the president “will have to say that they [U.S. 
troops] are going to come out. It keeps tension in the country up. That’s one of the problems.” 
Former congressman and White House congressional advisor Clark MacGregor reported that 
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even “hawkish” congressmen were pushing for a promise of no new deployments to Vietnam in 
conjunction with an acceleration in withdrawals. MacGregor hoped that Nixon’s 7 April 
statement would be “different in degree and kind,” not simply stating a troop number and date as 
the president had done in previous statements.130  
Within this debate about troop withdrawals, administration officials also mulled 
eliminating the draft, a 1968 campaign promise and still a goal for Nixon. The Gates 
Commission, the president’s 15-member panel tasked with studying its possibility, concluded in 
1970 that an all-volunteer army was feasible. After meeting with General Abrams in Saigon, 
Alexander Haig recommended to Kissinger that the army should study whether an all-volunteer 
force could sustain 50,000 to 60,000 troops by 1 September 1971. Haig reported, “Chances 
appear good from here but General Abrams has declined to commit himself on this item.”131 To 
the consternation of many, including conservative journalist William Buckley, Nixon would 
make no mention of ending the draft on 7 April. That night, after first assuring Henry Kissinger 
of his positive review of the television address, Buckley asked why the president did not end the 
draft. Kissinger responded, “The numbers are still too high. That is our plan. This is the first 
thing we will do when we are at the number that permits it.” Kissinger later continued, “On the 
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draft business, you can be assured we will get to it. I have seen the Army and am convinced that 
a major change is needed.”132 However, the draft would remain until 27 January 1973.  
During this period between the president’s 22 March interview and 7 April speech, along 
with debating the troop withdrawal number, Nixon’s team also researched Lam Son battle 
statistics and propaganda. The administration used enemy casualties and destroyed supplies as 
another data point to quantify Lam Son’s contribution to the overall war. The collection of these 
statistics first began, as is usual after any military operation, with intelligence estimates. As early 
as late February, Kissinger sent the president examples of disruptions to enemy supplies that 
were gathered from intercepted North Vietnamese messages. Kissinger continued to press for 
assessments of such statistics through his chairmanship of the Washington Special Actions 
Group (WSAG), a committee formed in 1969 to deal with crises. By 1971, the WSAG consisted 
of officials from the National Security Council, State and Defense Departments, the CIA, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the White House. From late-March through the first week of April, 
conversations about these counts centered on complementary reports from the CIA and Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), in which the CIA focused more on supplies destroyed and captured 
while the DIA focused on human casualties.133  
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These intelligence numbers then became tools for political messaging. Nixon instructed 
Kissinger on 20 March to “get it down to short terms so people can understand it…terms like 
traffic to south cut more than half. Also the idea of guns and rounds of ammo. Millions of 
pounds of rice is good. Get it in words and see if you or Ken [speechwriter Khachigian] can get it 
into colorful language.”134 Although the president avoided getting into details of enemy 
casualties and supplies during his 22 March ABC interview, these numbers remained the 
administration’s main talking points about Lam Son once they decided to justify the operation as 
a victory. Up to a week before his 7 April address, Nixon considered including these numbers in 
the speech before ultimately deciding otherwise.  
The administration also grappled with the issue of countering North Vietnamese 
propaganda during this period. Writing to Bunker and Abrams on 27 March, Secretary of State 
Rogers blamed the “world press” and a “well orchestrated communist claque” for repeating 
Hanoi’s claims of victory in Lam Son 719. As a result, the White House expected “a significant 
psychological problem” and wanted to ensure that Thieu would take steps to counter this 
communist propaganda.135 After meeting with Thieu on 2 April to pass this message from the 
administration, Bunker reported back that “much was already underway.” Thieu’s efforts 
included television and radio propaganda, public rallies in provincial capitals, parades, press 
conferences, troop visits, and monetary and other rewards for troops and their families. President 
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Nixon also gave suggestions. In a discussion with Kissinger about a failed operation in which 24 
American servicemen were killed in comparison to 12 North Vietnamese, Nixon suggested 
publicly distributing information about political divisions within North Vietnam, which the 
White House received through communications intelligence, and an overall assessment of 
Hanoi’s heavy losses.136 
The administration counteracted prominent Americans on the propaganda front as well. 
Throughout March, Kissinger wrestled over his response to a request from Harold Willens, a 
wealthy California peace activist who founded a group called Business Executives Move for 
Vietnam Peace. Willens was planning a personal trip to South Vietnam and asked for the 
American embassy’s assistance with introductions. Because of their wealth and political 
connections, members of groups like Willens’s represented a portion of the domestic anti-war 
movement that the White House could not dismiss easily. Willens once described how the 
administration often characterized anti-war protestors “as either soft on Communism or soft-
headed, period,” a charge that was difficult to lodge onto successful, well-established 
executives.137 Kissinger described him as “obviously not a friend of the administration nor a 
friend of the Vietnamese Government.” After first refusing to offer assistance, Kissinger later 
decided that a better strategy was to shape “what kind of picture” Willens would receive from his 
trip by asking Ambassador Bunker to assign embassy personnel to help with his eventual April 
1971 visit.138    
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Amid these discussions over troop withdrawal numbers, Lam Son numbers, and 
countering propaganda, Nixon’s speechwriting team, spearheaded by future conservative 
stalwart and three-time presidential hopeful Pat Buchanan, along with input from all corners of 
the administration, began crafting the address for 7 April. Progressive drafts of this speech, in 
conjunction with memoranda and telephone transcripts from various administration officials 
during this time, show that while certain details were added and dropped during the normal 
editing process, main themes remained. Consistent items of focus included big-picture language 
about the American character, efforts to differentiate this speech from past addresses, and 
arguments for the reduction of American involvement in Vietnam. The team also avoided certain 
topics, some from the beginning and some over the process of writing. These topics included 
details to justify Lam Son 719, negotiations with the North Vietnamese, and the My Lai 
massacre. 
In the week following the president’s ABC interview, the administration and its 
surrogates spoke out aggressively about Laos to offset negative media assessments. They 
hammered the same talking points: that more supplies were destroyed than in the Cambodian 
operation, that Hanoi was set back many months and kept from undertaking any major 
offensives, and that the U.S. and South Vietnamese had achieved their goals.139 Believing that 
this strategy of repeating talking points was making little headway in changing public opinion, 
some in Nixon’s team advocated for focusing on the “big picture” in the 7 April speech.  
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On 27 March, Winston Lord, Kissinger’s special assistant and future ambassador to 
China, wrote to the national security advisor, “I don’t think a discussion of Laos should dominate 
the speech; the major focus should be on the big picture of how far we have come and where we 
are going.” Two days later, Pat Buchanan sent the president a memo in which communications 
staff assistant Ken Khachigian proposed making the bulk of the speech “a thoughtful, brief 
lecture on the American character.” Khachigian continued, “This is the time for the President to 
wear the hat of moral authority, of America’s calm voice in the face of heated overstatement.” 
On the cover letter, Buchanan argued that the “nation has heard, again and again and again, the 
arguments of what we are doing, and have done and why…the president can communicate to the 
people far more on his mind than simply the outcome of Laos – and the future of troop 
withdrawals.” Buchanan later reiterated his worry of “unnecessarily repeat[ed] word 
formulations and arguments the country has heard too many times.” Henry Kissinger disagreed. 
Kissinger felt that the “basic arguments” that the administration had been constantly repeating 
about Vietnam, including the statistics justifying Lam Son 719, were still important. The battle 
lines were drawn, with Lord, Buchanan, and Khachigian, making up the “big picture” camp and 
pressing for a move away from the details.140 The final speech ultimately represented the “big 
picture” camp. Nixon justified Lam Son 719 through general terms and referred only to 
“achievements,” rather than “success,” in Laos. In another indicator of the administration’s focus 
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on the domestic audience, Nixon ensured that American troop counts were the only numbers 
mentioned in the entire address.  
 Nixon’s congressional expert, Clark MacGregor, suggested to Kissinger that the speech 
be “different in kind and degree” from previous statements because “America needs a lift!” 
Though speaking about Congress, MacGregor’s description of a “deepening mood of 
depression” could have described the rest of American society.141 Ambassador to the United 
Nations John Scalli also argued that the speech needed more than withdrawal numbers, warning 
that “critics will step up the attack” otherwise. Using the president’s 7 October 1970 speech, his 
last television address on Vietnam, and their background materials as a point of comparison, 
Nixon’s writing team generated new themes to differentiate this speech from past ones.142  
One important theme remained the reduction of American involvement in Vietnam as 
proof of the success of Lam Son and Vietnamization. Near the top of a document titled “Main 
Points in President’s Speech,” Nixon aides wrote, “It is a complete distortion to call Lam Son a 
defeat; the best proof of its overall success is the fact that the withdrawal rate has actually been 
increased.”143 Nixon stated on 22 March that Lam Son was worthwhile because it saved 
American lives, with one calculable manifestation being troop withdrawals. Akin to arguing 
whether a chicken or egg comes first, Nixon’s speechwriters now argued that it was the 
acceleration of withdrawals which proved Lam Son’s success. This shift from “success is 
justified by the numbers” to “increased withdrawals means success” happened between 30 
March and 1 April. A 30 March speech draft devoted five pages to Laos, put it near the top of the 
speech, and listed damaged enemy supplies in painstaking detail. On 1 April, speechwriter 
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William Safire sent a new draft in which he “makes less of the laborious defense of the Laos 
operation” and urged that “the story of how many troops coming out by when be put up in the 
lead. Holding it for the end is a cheap device and we have never done it yet.”144 In the final 
speech, Nixon stated at the outset, “I have decided to increase the rate of American troop 
withdrawals for the period from May 1 to December 1.” As he did with a map in his television 
address about Cambodia almost one year prior, Nixon would use a visual aid, this time a graph, 
to bring home the point to viewers.145  
The writing team initially prepared two graphs, one showing the “Authorized Troop 
Level in South Vietnam” and another showing “U.S. Combat Deaths in Southeast Asia,” 
although Nixon used only the troop level chart. The team placed the graph on an easel to the 
president’s right and the camera occasionally panned and zoomed to it throughout the speech. 
The graph charted U.S. troop numbers in Vietnam from the early 1960s, through the day of the 
address, and continued until 1 December 1971. The display showed the troop number increase 
from under 50,000 in early 1965 to reach its peak of 549,500 around Nixon’s inauguration. This 
line then traced the troop number’s steady decline to 284,000 by 7 April 1971, and its predicted 
further decline by the promised 100,000 troops to reach 184,000 by 1 December 1971. This 
visual aid dramatically illustrated the decline in troop levels since Nixon took office.146 
As a reminder of the perils of this American-centric view of measuring the war’s success 
by the number of American lives saved, Secretary Laird cautioned the president on 6 April that 
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while American involvement decreases, danger to the ARVN would increase as they take over 
more of the combat. Laird implored, “I believe it is important to keep these factors in mind as the 
enemy is in the Spring campaign cycle, normally his most active period of the year.”147 As late 
as two days before the speech, Kissinger recommended that President Nixon add lines that 
detailed the decrease to South Vietnamese casualties as well as the reduction of U.S. bombing. 
Senator George McGovern, Nixon’s eventual opponent in the 1972 election, was among those 
arguing that Vietnamization was simply “substituting Asian for American casualties,” a group 
that Kissinger referred to as “Doves.”148 This resulted in Nixon’s addition of a sentence: “South 
Vietnamese casualties have also dropped significantly in the past two years.” However, its 
meaning was diminished by being sandwiched between detail about the fivefold drop in 
American casualties over two years and a return to the focus on saving American lives: “One 
American dying in combat is one too many. But our goal is no American fighting man dying 
anyplace in the world. Every decision I have made in the past and every decision I make in the 
future will have the purpose of achieving that goal.”149 
Another topic that the speechwriting team had intended to tackle in the 7 April address 
was peace negotiations. Six months earlier, the president spoke publicly about negotiations with 
Hanoi for the first time during a 7 October 1970 television address. Up until this 1970 address, 
Nixon had hoped that secrecy would lead to progress in either the public talks led by Henry 
Cabot Lodge or private ones led by Henry Kissinger. However, by late 1970, negotiations had 
stalled. To break the impasse, Nixon used the 1970 address to outline the American position 
publicly: a cease-fire, an international peace conference, negotiation of a timetable for complete 
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withdrawal, a political settlement for South Vietnam, and an immediate release of prisoners-of-
war. As Henry Kissinger wrote of the administration’s goals at the time, “All senior officials 
came to favor anything that might get the negotiations off dead center and our critics off the front 
pages.” Kissinger recalled that while this was initially well-received, with even the 
administration’s detractors in Congress and the press praising the speech as reasonable, Hanoi 
rejected it shortly afterward, freezing negotiations again.150 Even with this checkered track 
record, in 1971, Nixon’s writing team again considered keeping the topic of negotiations at the 
forefront of the address. The public clamoring for an announced end to the war was just too loud 
to ignore. However, Nixon would change course at the last minute. 
A 28 March speech draft devoted an entire paragraph to the “hope for a negotiated 
settlement” within the first minute of the speech. Nixon removed this paragraph but kept another 
paragraph on negotiations later in the speech. The night before the address, Nixon also removed 
this commentary after consultation with Kissinger. At the same time, he removed another 
paragraph offering to negotiate with Hanoi on a fixed timetable for mutual withdrawal and re-
worded a passage about prisoners-of-war.151 In the final televised version, Nixon would devote 
just two paragraphs to the topics of negotiations and withdrawal timetables, located near the 
middle of the speech. In his paragraph addressing negotiations, he cited the same five points 
from October 1970. In the paragraph addressing his decision not to publish a timetable, Nixon 
explained that doing so would only make it more difficult to free prisoners-of-war, remove the 
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incentive for a settlement, and give the enemy information to launch attacks against the 
American military.  
Eleventh-hour edits to speech drafts show the sensitivity and importance that the 
administration placed on messaging and also the difficulty of these choices. Another of Nixon’s 
last-minute removals was any reference to the My Lai massacre. Amid Nixon’s speech 
preparation, the trial of William Calley, the only officer convicted for the killing of unarmed 
civilians at the South Vietnamese village of My Lai, commanded front-page coverage. Calley 
was convicted on 29 March, sentenced on 31 March, and received a downgrade of his sentence 
from the president on 1 April. A 30 March draft of the 7 April address devoted two paragraphs to 
the Calley trial, and three subsequent paragraphs to supporting the troops. One paragraph directly 
addressing Calley remained in a 4 April draft, but was removed two days later, with its meaning 
imbedded into two phrases: “atrocity charges in individual cases” and “isolated acts of cruelty.” 
This 6 April draft also argued that these isolated acts were the exception to “the tens of 
thousands of individual American soldiers who…have tried to help the people of South 
Vietnam.” This phrasing remained in the final draft. Pat Buchanan wrote that the “point about 
troops is made – and no one will be ignorant of what we are referring to.”152 The president 
ultimately decided against mentioning any negative aspects of the Vietnam War. Even during his 
final preparations mere hours before delivering the address, Nixon continued editing to keep 
things upbeat, telling Kissinger that “people don’t want to hear about sorrow so much.”153  
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The 7 April TV Address 
The result of all of this research, strategizing, and writing between 22 March and 7 April 
was a well-received address that stopped short of calling Lam Son a success and refrained from 
setting a final deadline for American departure from Vietnam. Nixon’s punchline, previewed at 
the top of the speech and specified in detail six minutes later, was that “between May 1 and 
December 1 of this year, 100,000 more American troops will be brought home from South 
Vietnam.” This was after Nixon reminded viewers, using his visual aid, that U.S. troop numbers 
had consistently declined since he took office. He then declared Cambodia a “success,” touted 
great “achievements” in Laos, and linked this accelerated troop withdrawal as proof of the 
success of Vietnamization.  
By choosing not to include any numbers in the speech outside of U.S. troop counts, 
Nixon’s writers deliberately refocused the goal of the war to be about saving American lives. 
This built upon the groundwork the president began on 22 March and is further illustrated 
through some seemingly throwaway comments. After announcing the 100,000-troop withdrawal 
Nixon stated, “The Government of South Vietnam fully supports the decision I have just 
announced.” Rather than elaborate on how the United States would ensure the viability of South 
Vietnam without American troops, Nixon immediately pivoted, saying, “Now, let’s look toward 
the future.” In other references to South Vietnam’s future, Nixon used phrases such as “leave in a 
way that gives the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to survive,” and “leave Vietnam in a 
way that offers a brave people a realistic hope of freedom,” a significant downgrade from the 
original goal of “preserving a non-Communist South Vietnam.” The president placed U.S. 
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withdrawal as his primary goal, a stable South Vietnam as his second, and crafted the narrative to 
accommodate these priorities.154  
It would turn out to be another last-minute addition that garnered the president his most 
positive headlines the next day. Nixon decided to conclude his speech with an emotional 
anecdote, which he wrote in secret on a yellow legal pad and kept out of the advance transcript 
for the media.155 Rick Perlstein calls it a “sentimental climax, a masterpiece,” which he narrates 
vividly in Nixonland: 
“‘We had an award ceremony in the East Room of the White House just a few weeks ago. 
And at that ceremony I remember one of the recipients, Mrs. Karl Taylor, from 
Pennsylvania. Her husband was a Marine sergeant, Sergeant Karl Taylor…After I 
presented her the Medal, I shook hands with their two children, Karl, Jr.–he was 8 years 
old-and Kevin, who was 4. As I was about to move to the next recipient, Kevin suddenly 
stood at attention and saluted.’  
Pause. 
‘I found it rather difficult to get my thoughts together.’ 
[Nixon’s] voice deepened. 
‘My fellow Americans, I want to end this war in a way that is worthy of the sacrifice of 
Karl Taylor.’ 
[Nixon] was speaking very slowly. 
‘And I think he would want me to end it in a way that would increase the chances that 
Kevin and Karl, and all those children like them here and around the world, could grow 
up in a world where none of them would have to die in war; that would increase the 
chance for America to have what it has not had in this century–a full generation of 
peace.’”156 
 
President Nixon added the Taylor Family anecdote less than one day before the speech. H.R. 
Haldeman was still tracking down details for Mrs. Taylor, Karl, Jr., and Kevin on 6 April as he 
wrote in his notes that day, “from mil aide – the 5 yr old that saluted was he the brother? –
details.”157 Because the addition was so rushed, no one from the White House staff had time to 
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contact Mrs. Taylor beforehand. Nixon said to Kissinger after the speech, “I hope the mother 
stands up and – I haven’t checked that with her but she will do the right thing, she was a 
Marine’s wife.”158 Kissinger then called Mrs. Taylor an hour later, at 11:28pm, to convey that 
the president “asked me to call you and apologize for using your name but he felt he wanted to 
do this to make his point and he hoped that you weren’t hurt.” Mrs. Taylor responded, “I was 
rather shocked but very proud.”159 
The next day, The New York Times published an article with the headline, “Salute 
Returned to a Boy by Nixon.” The article quoted Mrs. Taylor, declaring that her late husband 
“believed in what he was doing and he thought he had to do it for the sake of his children.” Other 
articles featuring the family, such as that by the Associated Press, included a photo of four-year-
old Kevin Taylor saluting in his pajamas from his living room. H.R. Haldeman remarked to the 
president after presenting him the Times article, “If we’d staged it we couldn’t have thought it up 
better.” Haldeman also wrote in his diary on the day after the address that Nixon “was very 
pleased with the way he worked the emotional part into the speech, and thinks that’s what really 
made it, and of course, he’s absolutely right.”160 
After delivering the speech, Nixon initially said that he did not want to take any calls that 
evening. However, he could not help but revert to his habit of post-game analysis and spoke on 
the phone at least nine times before the night’s end. Members of the president’s inner circle 
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quickly praised the address. Henry Kissinger told Nixon that it was “the best speech you 
delivered since you have been in office,” reported that television news commentators John 
Chancellor and Dan Rather gave favorable reviews, and conveyed how “moved – overwhelmed” 
staffers Alexander Haig and Winston Lord were. Ambassador Bunker cabled from Saigon that 
the speech “has inspired us all with a renewed sense of dedication and determination.” Reverend 
Billy Graham believed that the president diffused his critics and told him that his “sincerity and 
manner of presentation was just excellent.”161 
It appeared that the speech also received a positive reception from the American people. 
The Opinion Research Corporation, a market research company founded in 1938 by Claude 
Robinson and George Gallup, announced that the percentage of those polled who said they 
approved “of the way President Nixon is handling the Vietnam situation” increased from 41% in 
early March 1971 to 48% by mid-April 1971.162 David Derge, the president of another market 
research firm hired by the administration, Behavioral Research Associates, reported that of those 
who had seen, heard, or read about President Nixon’s public appearances since 1 March 1971, 
“the favorable reactions to these appearances outnumber the unfavorable reactions two to one.” 
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However, Derge pointed out that he did not know whether the favorable group “was already 
largely in agreement with the president on most matters.”163 
Print media, however, was not yet sold by Nixon’s latest arguments. Most journalists for 
the main American weekly magazines felt that President Nixon had not said anything new. 
Time’s authors wrote that when “Richard Nixon appeared on television to discuss his embattled 
Viet Nam policy, he changed virtually nothing.” They also called the 7 April address a “foxhole 
speech, digging tenaciously in defense of his existing position.” Newsweek’s writers also 
lamented that this was “more of the same” from the administration and criticized Nixon’s refusal 
“to set a date for completion.” Consistent with their more supportive stance towards the 
administration, coverage in U.S. News and World Report remained neutral, basically reiterating 
the president’s statements from 7 April.164 
Correspondents from daily newspapers echoed similar criticisms the following day. Both 
The New York Times and The Washington Post printed the full text of the speech. Max Frankel of 
The Times called Nixon’s address a “vigorous defense of his objectives and tactics” and objected 
to Nixon’s plea to “listeners to take his word over those of television and newspaper reporters 
and analysts.” Frankel also deduced from Nixon’s change in tone that the president “had 
powerful personal as well as official reasons for wishing to end the war.” Times editors wrote 
that Nixon “did not change his policy, just the way he defended it.” Even in James Naughton’s 
article profiling the Taylor family, with which the president and H.R. Haldeman were so pleased, 
the piece did not pass judgment on either the administration’s policy nor the success of Nixon’s 
communication strategy. Naughton simply quoted Mrs. Taylor’s positive words without 
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including his assessment.165 Chalmers Roberts of The Washington Post pointed out Nixon’s 
refusal to set a deadline. Roberts also quoted four senators and a member of Congress, including 
Democratic Senator and Nixon’s eventual 1972 opponent George McGovern, the Cooper-Church 
Amendment’s more moderate Democratic Senator Frank Church, and Republican Representative 
and future vice president Gerald Ford, all of whom reacted “along predictable lines.” In another 
Post article that day, Don Oberdorfer criticized Nixon for three failures: to set an end date, to end 
the draft, and to change the U.S. role in Vietnam from ground combat to air support. He 
questioned how Nixon would fulfill his promise to end the war as well.166 Finally, The Wall 
Street Journal’s editors wrote that the increase in the withdrawal rate to 14,300 per month was 
“certain to leave critics dissatisfied.” Robert Keatley described the speech as “generally hard-
line” and wrote that the president “drew praise from his supporters but failed to move his 
critics.” Keatley also interpreted Nixon’s language about being “held accountable by the 
American people” to mean that he would either withdraw all Americans from Vietnam before the 
1972 election or is prepared to “face the consequences at the polls.”167 
In a foreshadowing of the new direction to which American foreign policy would shift, 
all three dailies also featured front-page coverage about China inviting the United States ping 
pong team to visit Beijing alongside their coverage of the president’s speech. As Takashi Oka 
wrote in The New York Times, “Some analysts of Chinese affairs here view the invitation as 
Peking’s [Beijing’s] first concrete response to a series of American moves aimed at improving 
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relations with China.” The Post’s Terence Smith quoted a State Department official as saying 
that the invitation is “clearly consistent with the hopes expressed by the President and Secretary 
of State that there could be greater contact between the American and Chinese peoples.”168 
While it appears that Nixon first heard of the Chinese table tennis invitation along with 
the public, he would have seen the move as a result of his work over the last year towards a 
normalization of relations with the People’s Republic. The United States and China had 
maintained an ambassadorial-level bilateral line of communication since 1 August 1955. These 
talks aimed to “discuss the repatriation of nationals and other issues of mutual concern.” With 
the Communist takeover of China in 1949, the start of the Korean War in 1950, and the U.S. 
refusal to recognize the new Chinese government, U.S. citizens in China and Chinese citizens in 
the U.S. faced difficulties returning home. First started in Geneva in 1955, and later moved to 
Warsaw in 1958, the last of these intermittent talks, later dubbed the “Warsaw Meetings,” 
occurred on 20 February 1970. The Chinese canceled the next meeting scheduled for 20 May due 
to their objection to the U.S. and South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia, effectively ending 
these formal talks.169 Skeptical of the State Department’s ability to contain leaks, Nixon and 
Kissinger established secret contacts to China through multiple channels on their own, including 
in Paris and Romania. However, the most fruitful ended up being Pakistani President Yahya 
Khan.  
This direct but slow channel, relying on hand-carried, unsigned sheets of paper between 
the U.S. president and national security advisor to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou En Lai, 
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became active in late 1970. By the time China extended its invitation to the American ping-pong 
team on 6 April 1971, at least three messages had been transmitted through the Pakistani channel 
between the U.S. and Chinese leaders. In October 1970, Nixon and Kissinger asked the Chinese 
to normalize relations. A month later, Mao and Zhou responded that they would accept a special 
envoy to Beijing to discuss the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan. In December, the 
Americans countered that the meeting in Beijing “would not be limited only to the Taiwan 
question but would encompass other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions.” 
As a nod to Taiwan, Nixon added that “the policy of the United States Government is to reduce 
its military presence in the region of East Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region 
diminish.” Both sides also took steps to signal an easing of tensions from late 1970 to early 1971, 
such as Mao hosting exiled American journalist Edgar Snow in Beijing and Nixon ending the 
restriction on Americans traveling to China.170  
 China’s move was not unexpected. While awaiting a response to their December 
message, Nixon and Kissinger tracked positive signs from the Chinese side. Days after Nixon 
lifted the travel restrictions, Kissinger reported that “the Chinese really blasted Russia,” when 
Chinese newspapers criticized the USSR for being overly militaristic and expansionist on the 
hundredth anniversary of the Paris Commune, the two-month-long takeover of Paris by a 
socialist government in 1871, which was revered by communist leaders.171 Days after the ping 
pong invitation was announced, Nixon admitted to Kissinger, Haldeman, and former journalist 
and administration media consultant John Scali that he “did not know the Ping-Pong team was 
going to happen like that.” However, Kissinger expressed his “feeling that something was going 
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to happen,” and for months, Nixon had expected “some thaw.”172 Besides, Kissinger did not 
doubt that the Chinese, who he considered “very subtle,” chose the invitation’s timing with great 
consideration. Nixon, just before a farewell call with the outgoing Taiwanese Ambassador and 
soon-to-be Foreign Minister Zhou Shu Kai, wondered aloud to Kissinger whether it was 
deliberate on the part of the Chinese that the ping pong team made front-page news on the same 
day of this meeting. “No question,” replied the national security advisor.173  
The timing was fortuitous for both sides. Although the release of the Pentagon Papers in 
June 1971 would renew the debate about the origins of America’s involvement in Vietnam, the 
public’s attention on the current war would wane with Nixon’s 7 April TV address. For the 
remainder of 1971, much of the public’s focus was redirected towards the warming of relations 
with China, beginning with Nixon’s July 1971 announcement of his trip to Beijing and 
culminating with Nixon’s historic visit, the first by a U.S. president, in February 1972. Nixon’s 7 
April television address and the ping pong invitation would set in motion a string of 
developments that allowed Nixon, by 1972, to achieve his goal of putting Vietnam in the 
rearview so that he could concentrate on other global ambitions. 
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Chapter 4: Why Did Nixon’s Plan Work? 
In the period leading up to the president’s 7 April speech, Nixon needed to combat any 
argument that America was abandoning South Vietnam. Senator George McGovern, Nixon’s 
future 1972 opponent, and an outspoken congressional “dove,” characterized the United States 
withdrawal as simply “substituting Asian for American casualties.” Two days before the speech, 
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed ways to address this charge. Expressing his 
frustration with liberal politicians who opposed his policies, Nixon asserted, “I’ve determined to 
just see it [withdrawal] through and the hell with them…. If it fails, it fails.” After Kissinger 
reassured the president by calling this a “heroic posture,” Nixon explained further, “Believe it or 
not, there is no other course for this country.” Richard Nixon planned to accelerate the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam no matter the result of Lam Son 719 and crafted his 
narrative to the American people to suit this end.174  
The danger of South Vietnam falling to the communists was always a possibility. 
However, the prevention of this risk became less of a priority to the administration as they 
increasingly focused on saving American lives. President Nixon showed this by downplaying the 
language he used to describe his goals for South Vietnam. Phrases such as “we cannot guarantee 
their survival” from 22 March and “reasonable chance to survive” and “realistic hope of 
freedom” from 7 April reflected the demotion of South Vietnam in the president’s priorities. This 
was not lost on the South Vietnamese either. The author of a Newsweek article from 5 April 
quoted a Saigon resident as remarking, “Vietnamization…means only that the color of the bodies 
is now different.”175 As early as 11 March, a week before news of an ARVN retreat from Laos 
began to hit the U.S. press, Nixon said privately, “I don’t give a goddamn if they leave 
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tomorrow.” Moreover, though they maintained a façade of indecision for public relations, Nixon 
and Kissinger set the withdrawal number at 100,000 American troops at least a week prior to the 
7 April announcement. The only factor restraining Nixon from authorizing a higher number was 
the threat of Thieu losing his October 1971 election, a loss of face that would be too great for the 
United States to bear.176 If military victory over Hanoi and saving South Vietnam became 
increasingly unrealistic goals, then why did Nixon undertake Lam Son 719? 
Into the operation’s initial phase, Nixon, Kissinger, and other decision-makers 
maintained optimism that Lam Son 719 could prove to be the strategic blow to the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail that forced Hanoi to a negotiated peace. On 22 February, when Phase Two of the operation 
was already diverging from the plan and some ARVN soldiers had retreated from firebases 
inside Laos, Admiral Moorer still told the president, “we had trouble with the one battalion,” but 
“we just have to stay with this thing. I think it is going to come out all right.”177 Even if the onset 
was rooted in idealism, reality set in by mid-March after the operation’s major setbacks. By that 
time, with clear victory no longer a possibility, the operation’s purpose shifted. On 16 March, 
after declaring to Kissinger that Laos was “the right thing to do,” the president explained that the 
purpose of both the Cambodian and Laotian incursions was “getting to another point. Now we’ve 
reached the other point…. Now, every decision is now made not in terms of, well, what’s the 
effect going to be on Saigon. The decision has got to be made on what’s the effect on us.”178  
                                                            
176 Nixon, 22 March Interview. Nixon, 7 April TV Address. “Richard Nixon, H. R. ‘Bob’ Haldeman, and Henry A. 
Kissinger on 11 March 1971,” Conversation 466-012 (PRDE Excerpt A), Presidential Recordings Digital 
Edition [Fatal Politics, ed. Ken Hughes] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–), accessed on 20 
October 2019, http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006732 (hereafter, 11 March 1971 White House Tape, 
UVA). 
177 FRUS, Volume VII, Document 134. On 14 February 1971, Henry Kissinger forwarded to President Nixon an 
assessment from General Abrams. In the report, Abrams noted that “the operation has gone well despite the delays 
caused by weather and bad road conditions,” and that he believed “the operation will move west at the earliest 
possible time and is satisfied with the way it is going.” FRUS, Volume VII, Document 129. 
178 Tape of a 16 March 1971 9:30am Oval Office meeting between Nixon and Kissinger in Brinkley and Nichter, 42. 
 
 68 
As Nixon went on to discuss the status of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 
with the Soviet Union, one can infer that the “other point” to which the president referred meant 
America’s other global ambitions such as SALT and China. Nixon also gave insight into Lam 
Son’s purpose five days earlier. “We’ve tried everything. We’ve done everything the military 
wanted. We have—we’ve done everything to our own satisfaction in order to bring the war to a 
successful conclusion.” The president was blunter when addressing ARVN capabilities without 
U.S. ground support. “It’s good for them to learn how strong they are and how weak. But I’m not 
going to allow their weakness and their fear of the North Vietnamese to-to-to delay us.”179 Even 
if the president believed that one purpose of Lam Son 719 was to show that the United States 
exhausted all options in Vietnam before withdrawing, how would he explain this to the 
American people, especially to those that lost loved ones in this war? 
As word trickled in about ARVN retreating hastily from Laos, Kissinger assured the 
president, “About PR, we don’t have to worry much. In fact, we can make it very positive.”180 
The writing team that worked on Nixon’s public remarks on 22 March and 7 April, as well as the 
administration’s allies who hit the airwaves in support of the president’s policies, embraced this 
mentality of accentuating the positive. Pentagon spokesman Jerry Friedheim wrote to the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense on 23 March that whether or not Lam Son 719 was a tactical military 
success, the minds of most Americans would be on U.S. withdrawals and “our determination to 
shift our strategic attention to other more important world goals.”181 This was essential as things 
looked quite dismal for the administration in late March to early April. 
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In the weeks leading up to the 7 April 1971 speech, all of the news coverage of Vietnam 
focused on either the failure of Lam Son 719 or the Calley trial. In addition to negativity in the 
media embodied by headlines such as Newsweek’s “A Bleak Week for Richard Nixon,” the 
administration also faced an unhappy public.182 A Gallup poll taken on 5 April showed that 
“public confidence in the way President Nixon is handling his job,” fell below 50% for the first 
time in his administration.183 Joseph Alsop wrote in the 8 April issue of The Washington Post 
that several White House staff members “came close to panic in the post-Laos political 
atmosphere.”184 It would have been hard to imagine from this low point that only eight months 
later, the president would begin his most consequential year in office. 
For Richard Nixon, 1972 was a banner year. It began with historic trips to Beijing and 
Moscow in February and May and concluded with an unprecedented November landslide 
election victory. The contrast to 1971 could not have been starker. While initial newspaper 
coverage of Nixon’s Beijing visit criticized the president for acceding to Chinese demands, 
especially concerning Taiwan, this did not dull the American public’s awe in seeing images of 
the president walking the Great Wall. Henry Kissinger later wrote, “For once a White House 
public relations strategy succeeded, and performed a diplomatic function as well. Pictures 
overrode the printed word.” Perhaps even more helpful to the administration was how news from 
China began to overshadow Vietnam. “As the American public gained hope from the China 
visit,’ Kissinger maintained, “Vietnam became less an obsession and more a challenge to be 
mastered. The Administration that had revolutionized international relations could not so easily 
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be accused of neglecting the deepest concern of the American people.”185 With Watergate’s 
shadow looming over much of President Nixon’s second term, it is often overlooked that 
Nixon’s 1972 election over McGovern was a historic victory. Nixon won 49 of the 50 states, 
representing 96.7 percent of electoral votes, and nearly 61 percent of the popular vote, the largest 
popular vote margin since 1936.186 Due to factors both within and outside of his control, the 
president was able to overcome the public negativity toward Lam Son, the Vietnam War, and the 
credibility gap in early 1971 to create opportunities for the successes he achieved in 1972. 
Among the actions within Nixon’s control was his public messaging in 1971 in the wake 
of Lam Son 719. In contrast to the Cambodian incursion of 1970—which resulted in massive, 
violent demonstrations all across the country—public backlash to Lam Son 719 was muted. This 
was due, in part, to the administration’s change in communication strategy from 1970 to 1971. 
The president’s public messaging for Lam Son differed from that for Cambodia in both 
frequency and content. Riding the positive momentum from his “silent majority” speech in late 
1969, on 20 April 1970, Nixon announced an additional withdrawal of 150,000 American troops 
from South Vietnam. However, ten days later, he went on the air again to announce the invasion 
of Cambodia. 
This second announcement sparked uprisings around the United States, such as at Kent 
State and other institutions by Americans opposed to a perceived escalation in the Vietnam War. 
On 3 June 1970, Nixon gave a television address in which he declared Cambodia the “most 
successful operation of this long and very difficult war.” In contrast, the president made no 
announcements before the start of Lam Son 719. Instead he left messaging to the South 
Vietnamese and Department of Defense briefers. Nixon’s first words about the Laotian operation 
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were in the form of a television interview on 22 March 1971. And although Nixon’s post-
operation television address on 7 April 1971 had echoes of his post-Cambodia address from 3 
June 1970, the two speeches widely varied in content.187 
In his 3 June 1970 speech, the president first called the Cambodian operation a success. 
He then reiterated the reasons for escalating the war. This was followed by a painstakingly 
detailed list of captured arms and supplies: “10 million rounds of ammunition,” “over 15,000 
rifles and machine guns and other weapons,” over 2,000 “heavy mortars and rocket launchers 
and recoilless rifles,” “90,000 rounds of ammunition,” and “more than 11 millions pounds of 
rice.” To illustrate the point, Nixon also showed a few minutes of a grainy Department of 
Defense video of American soldiers walking among captured enemy weapons and rice while the 
president provided the voice-over. Nixon then explained that the Cambodian operation “insured 
the continuance and success of our troop withdrawal program,” and that this operation would 
help to withdraw 50,000 of the 150,000 soldiers as promised two months earlier. It was this very 
level of detail and plethora of numbers against which Winston Lord, Pat Buchanan, and other 
“big picture” camp advisors argued in 1971, ultimately resulting in a far different address on 7 
April.188  
The change in the form and content of messaging from 1970 to 1971 was a strategic 
decision by the administration. However, fortuitous factors outside of Nixon’s control also 
contributed to his ability to shift attention away from Lam Son 719 and the Vietnam War. One 
factor was the Cooper-Church Amendment. While the administration viewed the amendment, 
which forbade the use of ground troops outside of South Vietnam, as a hindrance to their military 
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capabilities in Laos, this restriction had the unintended consequence of reducing public backlash 
to the operation by limiting the number of American casualties. The average number of 
American combat deaths in Vietnam and related operations, which totaled over 100 per week in 
June 1970, dropped to 46 per week by April 1971. Nixon’s team even created a chart titled “U.S. 
Combat Deaths in Southeast Asia” copying the format of the troop withdrawal chart he used on 
television. This second chart showed a steady decline in combat deaths since Nixon took office. 
The president ultimately decided against using it for the address.189 The increased danger faced 
by ARVN troops, now lacking the support of American ground troops in Laos, was one impetus 
for George McGovern’s claim that the administration was merely substituting Asian bodies for 
American ones.190  
Another factor from which the administration benefited was the decline of the anti-war 
movement. The implementation of a draft lottery system on 1 December 1969, which gave 
potential draftees much more clarity on their risk of being called up, “eased the psychological 
strain” for many young American men before Nixon ended the draft completely in December 
1972. As foreign policy expert Adam Garfinkle argues in Telltale Hearts, the anti-war campaign 
was not as crucial a factor in bringing about the end of the Vietnam War as many Americans had 
thought. Writing about the 1970 demonstrations in the wake of Cambodia, Garfinkle argues that 
they “were a sort of spontaneous conditioned reflex to an extraordinarily crisp and clear 
escalation of the war in Southeast Asia and on campus. With a single exception, there was not 
much in the way of large, nationally organized public protest thereafter, and it was not because 
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of students’ fear of getting shot.” This “single exception” included rallies in late April 1971 in 
Washington, DC. Various protest groups held events over multiple days, including Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War led by their national spokesman and future Secretary of State John 
Kerry. However, Garfinkle labels these April 1971 occurrences as otherwise “uneventful” and 
attributes the ultimate decline of the movement to a combination of balkanization, administration 
tactics, a poor economy, and the evolution of campus subcultures.191 Political scientist John 
Mueller pushes even further, arguing that the protest movement was counterproductive. 
“Opposition to the war in Vietnam came to be associated with rioting, disruption, and bomb 
throwing, and war protesters, as a group, enjoyed negative popularity ratings to an almost 
unparalleled degree.”192 This decline in the anti-war movement reflected a general lethargy 
pervading the American public towards the Vietnam War.193 
For as much as the Nixon administration focused on his messaging in the wake of the 
negative media portrayals of Lam Son 719 in mid-March 1971, only 14% of the audience 
watched the president’s 22 March interview with ABC’s Howard K. Smith. As these were the 
days of only three television channels, the other 86% of viewers either watched a movie on NBC 
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or a comedy special on CBS. Addressing this low viewership statistic, authors in Time described 
Americans’ apathy toward the war at this point in 1971. “Long habit has ingrained a sort of 
sullen skepticism about the war, an incredulity that is often oddly mixed with boredom.194 On 12 
May 1971, David Derge, the president of polling firm Behavioral Research Associates, conveyed 
to H.R. Haldeman that “those who have seen, heard, or read about President Nixon’s 
appearances since March 1 vary from slightly more than half to three-fourths, which is lower 
than it should be.” While a lower-than-desired number of Americans paid attention to the 
president’s message, it was not for a lack of awareness of Lam Son 719. Derge wrote in another 
memo to Haldeman on 25 March 1971 that “knowledge of the Laos incursion was high 
(78%).”195 The indifference towards the war reflected in these low viewership numbers would be 
consistent with Mueller’s empirical study of Gallup polls from both the Korean and Vietnam 
conflicts. Mueller concluded that the longer a war dragged on, the less likely that Americans 
were concerned about casualties. Mueller defined this relationship of time and disinterest by a 
logarithm, writing, “While they did weary of the wars, they generally seem to have become 
hardened to the wars’ costs: they are sensitive to relatively small losses in the early stages, but 
only to large losses in later stages.”196 
As evidenced by their detailed polling, the Nixon administration was highly sensitive to 
public opinion, which would factor into policy decisions. Political scientists Benjamin Page and 
Robert Shapiro compared polling data with actual troop levels in Vietnam from October 1969 to 
December 1971 and discovered that “an additional 1% of people saying withdrawal was ‘too 
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slow’ tended to be followed one month later by withdrawal of about 488 extra men for the 
month.” The pair concluded, “Changes in public opinion apparently had a distinct impact on 
policy, in this as in many other cases based on similar time series data.”197 Given his attention to 
public opinion, the president would have considered the public’s reaction before embarking on 
his strategy of calling Lam Son a triumph for Vietnamization and accelerating troop withdrawals. 
He would have then calculated that an adequate proportion of the public would either believe 
him or not care enough to inhibit that strategy’s progress.  
In response to Hanoi’s “Easter Offensive,” an invasion of South Vietnam launched on 30 
March 1972, Nixon authorized Operation Linebacker, the first sustained bombing campaign of 
North Vietnam since 1968, which began on 9 May and lasted for six months. Shortly after 
Nixon’s public address on 8 May 1972 announcing the beginning of Linebacker, he said to aides, 
“The American people support the airstrikes. We polled the goddamn thing. They don’t give a 
shit about negotiations. They don’t care. You realize that? They don’t care.”198 Whether or not 
the American people truly cared about the bombing, Americans’ level of concern over Nixon’s 
Vietnam policy did not prevent him from becoming re-elected by an unprecedented majority in 
November 1972. Adam Garfinkle sums up the value of Nixon’s strategy: “Clearly, most people 
did not care as much about how many Asians died in Southeast Asia as they did about the level 
of U.S. ground combat participation and how many Americans died. Ending the draft and 
punching the wind out of the antiwar movement on the one hand, and escalating the air war on 
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the other, was a clever and effective White House tactic.”199 Also effective, and certainly helpful 
to his re-election bid, were Nixon’s successes with China and the USSR. 
Nixon and Kissinger’s communications through their secret channels to Beijing and 
Moscow kept the incursion from derailing any diplomatic efforts with the two communist 
powers. A growing rift between China and the Soviet Union also helped the United States in 
these separate efforts.200 Nixon announced in a news conference on 17 February that Lam Son 
was “not directed against Communist China,” and that he did not believe that Beijing had “any 
reason to interpret this as a threat against them or any reason therefore to react.” This was in 
response to a message received two weeks earlier from Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao 
Guan Hua through Norway that the Chinese understood the American foreign policy of leaving 
Vietnam and pivoting to China. In China and the Vietnam Wars, Qiang Zhai writes that “the 
limited U.S. involvement in the Laotian invasion had indicated to the Chinese that Nixon did not 
intend to reverse his policy of disengagement from Vietnam.” At the same time, China’s 
continued support to North Vietnam, as exemplified by Zhou En Lai’s visit to Hanoi from 5 to 8 
March 1971, was tempered by Zhou’s reticence to lead a Communist “worldwide People’s 
Front” along with the Soviet Union and North Vietnam, as well as Beijing’s gentler criticism of 
Lam Son 719 as compared to Cambodia the year before.201 Winston Lord later described the 
president’s thinking during this time. “He thought if he opened China… the drama and the 
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importance of dealing with the giant would put in perspective the rather messy exit from 
Vietnam.”202  
Nixon similarly kept Moscow at bay from overreacting to Operation Lam Son 719. While 
the Laotian incursion was progressing, he and Kissinger continued pushing Soviet leaders 
through their secret channel on the topics of West Berlin and SALT. Kissinger later described the 
monopoly that his National Security Council held over negotiations with China and the USSR by 
complaining that “it was tough on the nerves of the NSC staff, who had the sole responsibility of 
backstopping three major negotiations [20 May SALT agreement, Berlin negotiations, and the 
opening to China] simultaneously in the midst of the Laos operation.”203 Anatoly Dobrynin, the 
Soviet ambassador to six Cold War American presidents including Nixon, recalled that in early 
1971, the Politburo decided that it was in Russia’s “long-term interest to demonstrate the 
possibility of a further development of Soviet-American relations in spite of their inherent 
fluctuations,” and to become more “actively involved with Nixon.”204  
 A combination of these factors both within and outside of Nixon’s control allowed him to 
climb out of the dire failures of March 1971 to achieve the successes of 1972. A key to this 
transition was Nixon’s accurate reading of the pulse of the nation beginning with the tone of his 
7 April 1971 television address. He gambled, correctly, that enough people would either believe 
his case for Vietnamization or just not care. Had Watergate not dominated much of Nixon’s 
second term both in practice and in historical memory, 1972 would have formed the plot of a 
major political comeback story. Nonetheless, Nixon’s path from the operational failure of Lam 
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Son 719 in mid-March 1971 to his public declaration of the success of Vietnamization on 7 April 
1971 can provide some perspectives about presidential communications. 
Firstly, the president correctly read his audience in 1971, which he failed to do in 1970. 
The emotional state of the American people shifted greatly between 1970 and 1971. Nixon’s 
recollection of the days in early May 1970 following the deaths at Kent State included a 
conversation with Kissinger, in which he recalled his national security advisor stating, “I still 
think you made the right decision…. But in view of what has happened I fear I may have failed 
to advise you adequately of the domestic dangers.” Nixon acknowledged this failure to read his 
public and anticipate the violent aftermath that resulted. Nixon wrote that he “assumed full 
responsibility” and told Kissinger, “Don’t waste time rehashing things we can’t do anything 
about.”205  
Henry Kissinger realized in hindsight that the anti-war movement, which had been 
dormant since the “silent majority” speech in November 1969, was ready to pounce by the 
president’s 30 April 1970 speech announcing the Cambodian operation. Kissinger also 
concluded that although the violence was likely unavoidable as “dialogue in our democracy had 
broken down,” he believed that the media’s unfair criticism, which stirred up university students 
around the United States, combined with the “excessive” rhetoric in Nixon’s speeches on 
Cambodia, did little to help the situation. The president “played into the hands of his critics by 
presenting an essentially defensive operation, limited in both time and space, as an earthshaking, 
conscience-testing event, lending color to their claim that he had exceeded presidential authority 
by ‘expanding’ the war,” Kissinger wrote. Although he always maintained that the Cambodian 
operation was necessary from a military perspective, he felt that they quickly lost control of the 
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debate; what should have been a reasonable discussion on tactics descended into an irrational 
battle about morals.206  
In contrast, Nixon’s speech on 7 April 1971 after the Laotian operation resulted in 
marches on Washington by a declining anti-war movement, but nowhere near the level of 
violence seen the year before. Nixon remarked to Kissinger on 30 March 1971, “On the Laotian 
thing – that’s going to peter out. They’ll emote about that for a week or so then have the troop 
announcement and then they’ll emote about that. Then eyes will go to the Congress, about what 
they’ll do about it. It isn’t the public sentiment we’re talking about.”207 Incidentally, instead of 
calling this 1971 speech, which avoided a detailed discussion of military tactics and pivoted to a 
moral argument for the U.S. to stay in Vietnam, “excessive,” Kissinger wrote that Nixon’s line 
about leaving in a way that gave South Vietnam “a reasonable chance to survive as a free 
people” was “valid and central.”208 While the differences in public reaction from 1970 to 1971 
resulted from many factors outside of Nixon’s control—including the Congressional restriction 
on ground troops, a weakening anti-war movement, and increasing public indifference towards 
the war—the way that the administration read this public sentiment and tailored its messaging 
was crucial to their ability to accomplish policy goals.  
The second perspective in presidential communication to be gained from this period is 
the way the administration leveraged allies. As Nixon explained to Kissinger, “The main thing is 
to mobilize all of our friends.”209 The president’s strengthening of U.S. bilateral relations with 
the USSR and China helped to ensure that those countries would refrain from opposing the Laos 
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incursion in 1971.210 At home, the Nixon team relied on surrogates both inside and outside of the 
government. These allies would help push their narrative to the public by spreading the 
administration’s latest Lam Son 719 talking points. President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Joint 
Chiefs Chairman Thomas Moorer held multiple briefings for Republican members of Congress 
on Laos between 18 March and 7 April 1971. Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott and his fellow 
Congressional Republicans promised Nixon’s congressional liaisons that they would “call into 
the wires” after the 7 April speech.211 Kissinger maintained close contact with California 
Governor Ronald Reagan, who visited the president in San Clemente a week before the 
television address. Emphasizing the importance of maintaining these relationships, Nixon told 
Kissinger, “You gotta have a Reagan out there hitting the ball.”212 
Nixon’s team also relied on assistance from friends outside of the government, including 
members of the media and public figures. In the three weeks between mid-March to early-April 
1971, Kissinger had phone calls with Chuck Bailey of The Minneapolis Tribune, Henry Hubbard 
of Newsweek, Marty Schramm of Newsday, liberal columnist Tom Braden, and conservative 
columnist William Buckley. All of these calls displayed the personal intimacy of Kissinger’s 
relationships with these media figures. In a more complicated interaction, on Nixon’s instruction, 
Kissinger passed a publicly available report from General Abrams, which he portrayed to be an 
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inside scoop, to NBC News anchor John Chancellor and Miami Herald reporter David Kraslow 
at a lunch on 22 March.213 Other Nixon officials played a similar role, such as Ambassador to the 
United Nations George H.W. Bush, who asked Kissinger for the latest Lam Son talking points to 
respond to the editors of Newsweek after a lunch in New York.214  
The administration’s circles extended into the fields of entertainment and religion and the 
team was unafraid to use these connections to push policy also. In the days surrounding the 7 
April speech, Henry Kissinger spoke with entertainer Bob Hope and both Nixon and Kissinger 
had calls with televangelist and Christian leader Billy Graham. In Kissinger’s calls with both of 
these public personalities, he pointed out specifics about Lam Son 719 such as destroying more 
supplies than in Cambodia in 1970, setting the NVA back many months, keeping Hanoi from 
major offensives in 1971, and achieving their political goals. He even told Hope that “the 150 
tanks that [the NVA] had near Tchepone would have come to First Corps this year,” and that the 
American and ARVN forces “destroyed 100,000 tons of supplies.”215 While this is certainly a 
deeper level of military detail than most comedians like Hope would need to know, Kissinger 
perhaps expected Hope to assist the administration in messaging beyond surface-level support.  
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The third perspective one gleans from this period is Nixon’s focus on discrediting his 
detractors. Journalist James Reston explained Nixon’s success in this area. “Tricky tactics 
became common for a very simple reason: they worked. The voters didn’t like Communists and 
they weren’t very hot on reporters either, so Nixon bashed both.”216 The hostile relationship 
between the press and the Nixon administration began even before Nixon took office, and this 
period from March to April 1971 was no different. In his 22 March television interview, Nixon 
pointed to “philosophical difference” and different “vantage points” as the reason why he had 
fewer supporters in the press than any president in the twentieth century. Although he used the 
interview to highlight occasions where the media was incorrect, the president carefully pointed 
out that he was not there to “bait the press,” that he was not claiming that press inaccuracies were 
“deliberate or distorted,” nor was he complaining.217 Though vocal in his disdain for the press in 
private, Nixon was careful in his public words, often delegating the public press bashing to other 
administration members, especially Vice President Spiro Agnew.218 In a letter to all members of 
Congress in late March 1971, NBC president Julian Goodman complained of White House 
attempts to “interfere with the free flow of information” with “groundless attacks on television 
journalism for partisan purposes.”219 In an unusual on-air editorial the same week, NBC 
Anchorman John Chancellor declared, “Various people in the administration, including the 
president and vice president, have been making nasty cracks about the TV coverage of the 
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campaign in southern Laos…. We haven’t been able to tell the whole story because we haven’t 
been allowed to.”220  
Another target for disparagement were communists, both foreign and domestic. Journalist 
and presidential researcher Ken Hughes calls Nixon “America's foremost anti-Communist 
politician of the Cold War.” James Reston writes that Nixon was so successful in his crusade 
against communism that “it became standard Republican strategy for a generation.” Nixon would 
even combine these criticisms by labeling unfriendly journalists as communists.221 However, not 
every attempt at denigration worked. During a visit to the Pentagon on 1 May 1970, the morning 
after his address announcing the Cambodian operation, Nixon was recorded using the word 
“bums” to describe campus protestors. He wrote later in his memoirs, “I was referring to the 
arsonists at Berkeley and Yale and the Stanford firebombers and others like them…. Within a 
few days, it was the widespread impression that I had referred to all student protesters as 
‘bums.’” Kissinger threw a little more blame on his boss, writing that “the president’s 
statements, oscillating between the maudlin and the strident, did not help in a volatile situation 
where everything was capable of misinterpretation. His 1 May off-the-cuff reference to 
‘bums…blowing up campuses,’ a gibe overheard by reporters during a visit to the Pentagon, was 
a needless challenge, although it was intended to refer only to a tiny group of students who had 
firebombed a building and burned the life’s research of a Stanford professor.”222   
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Conclusion 
While a picture “doesn’t lie,” the story that it tells depends upon the perspective of the 
camera’s lens. Its narrative can vary widely depending on how near or far the photographer 
zooms. An assessment of a historical event similarly depends upon the parameters of both time 
and geography. As President Nixon said to Howard K. Smith about assessing Lam Son 719, “We 
can only see it in perspective because its goals were long range.” Any evaluation of the success 
or failure of the Nixon administration’s communication strategy after Lam Son 719 would also 
depend on one’s limits of time and space. If Nixon’s goal was to withdraw U.S. troops and leave 
behind a stable and sustainable South Vietnam, history would show that by April 1975, with 
Communist forces toppling Saigon months after Nixon’s resignation from office, the American 
effort had come up short. However, if his goal was to prevent a domestic backlash after Lam Son 
719 resembling the level of violence and upheaval that occurred after Cambodia, the president 
had succeeded. Even expanding Nixon’s goal to include gaining “enough political capital to 
achieve diplomatic successes with China and the USSR and win re-election in 1972,” the 
administration prevailed. It was this success that provides the greatest viewpoints in the 
administration’s political messaging from 18 March to 7 April 1971.223 
In hindsight, Operation Lam Son 719 was, at best, unable to achieve all of its goals. At 
worst, it exemplified the failure of Vietnamization, precipitated the destruction of South 
Vietnam, and showcased America’s defeat on the global stage. President Nixon continued to 
maintain as late as 1990 that Lam Son 719, in conjunction with the operation in Cambodia to cut 
“the flow of troops and arms from North Vietnam into South Vietnam,” had “enabled us to wind 
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down our involvement in war.”224 Ultimately, Nixon remained loyal, at least in public, to his 
assessment in 1978 that Lam Son was a “military success but a psychological defeat.”225 Melvin 
Laird and Creighton Abrams remained similarly optimistic. In the only authorized biography of 
Laird published in 2008, author Dale Van Atta writes that the former Secretary of Defense 
believed “that the operation diverted the North for a period of time to reconstruct that portion of 
the supply route.”226 General Abrams, who described Lam Son as the “largest battle of the war to 
date,” considered the operation a “death blow” to Hanoi in August 1971.227 
Others were more critical of the operation. Henry Kissinger wrote that Lam Son “fell far 
short of our expectations,” and that the operation “clearly did not realize all our hopes; nor did it 
fail completely.”228 Alexander Haig recalled, “It was clear to all, and especially to Nixon, that 
the operation had gone wrong.”229 In its official post-operation assessment written around March 
1972, MACV criticized ARVN “command and control,” blamed “strict security measures and 
the close-hold nature of the plan” for the less-than-ideal execution from both the American and 
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South Vietnamese militaries, and concluded that “Lam Son 719 did not lessen the North 
Vietnamese intent to continue aggressive operations in South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.”230  
In their memoirs published in 1978 and 1979, both Nixon and Kissinger pointed to the 
absence of a North Vietnamese attack for the remainder of 1971 and the South Vietnamese 
ability to repel Hanoi’s Easter Offensive in 1972, however marginally, as evidence of the success 
of Lam Son 719. “Thanks to Lam Son,” Nixon wrote, “there was no Communist offensive in 
1971 despite the largest influx of materiel in the history of the war.” Kissinger echoed a similar 
argument. “The combination of South Vietnamese ground forces and American air power,” he 
recalled, “enabled us just barely to blunt the North Vietnamese offensive in 1972. Without the 
attrition caused by the incursions into Laos and Cambodia, this would have been impossible. The 
campaigns of 1970 and 1971, in my view, saved us in 1972.”231 MACV also took this view, 
writing in its assessment that “Lam Son 719 might even have forestalled any major offensive 
until the spring of 1972.”232 
A common theme throughout these recollections is the negativity caused by press 
coverage. Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig all saw the media’s reporting as selective, especially when 
it came to the treatment of the ARVN retreat. All three pointed to the image of ARVN soldiers 
clinging to helicopter skids as the most notable example of the media’s distortion having lasting 
consequences. “It took only a few televised films,” Nixon wrote, “of ARVN soldiers clinging to 
the skids of our evacuation helicopters to reinforce the widespread misconception of the ARVN 
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forces as incompetent and cowardly.”233 Kissinger recalled that the ARVN “extracted themselves 
in a tolerable fashion,” called the images of retreating ARVN “unedifying and untypical,” and 
claimed that there was no way for the White House to give a balanced assessment as “those 
pictures destroyed any such prospect, and Washington was so badly informed and the operation 
deviated so much from the original plan that an alternative set of facts was not available in 
time.”234 Even in 1992, Haig sided with his bosses, writing that “On the whole, it was an orderly 
withdrawal, but television footage showed panicky ARVN soldiers clinging to the skids of 
American helicopters as the machines lifted out of the battle zone.”235 
It turns out that a picture, while it does not lie, is also worth a thousand words. The image 
of ARVN soldiers on helicopter skids came to define Operation Lam Son 719 for decades. Yet, 
President Nixon would not allow this psychological and public relations failure to become a 
political one. By campaigning, and winning, in 1968 on a promise to “end the war and win peace 
in the Pacific” by helping South Vietnam “fight the war and not fight it for them,” Nixon locked 
his administration on the path of withdrawal from the first day of his presidency.236 By March 
1971, one month into Lam Son 719, Nixon had to consider his strategy for re-election in 1972, 
possibly against Senator Ted Kennedy.237 Nixon also contended with a domestic anti-war 
movement enflamed by the campus violence of 1970 and a Congress increasingly less supportive 
by the day. He had plans for historic diplomatic breakthroughs with China and the Soviet Union. 
The way to achieve success in those areas was to exit Vietnam as soon as possible, no matter the 
result of Lam Son 719. Fortunately, the American public agreed. 
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Weeks before Nixon’s 7 April address, many in the media predicted that the president 
would announce an acceleration in troop withdrawals regardless of the ARVN’s performance in 
Lam Son.238 It was simply a balancing of competing interests, namely President Thieu’s 
reelection bid in October 1971, which compelled the president to decide on the figure of 100,000 
troops by 1 December 1971. However, while Nixon may have accepted privately that Lam Son 
719 was a lost cause, saying things like “if it fails, it fails” to Kissinger, he had to maintain 
optimism in public with lines like “leave in a way that gives the South Vietnamese a reasonable 
chance to survive” in his address.239 Yet, some of those journalists who correctly predicted that 
the president would pull out more troops from South Vietnam despite bad news from Laos were 
incorrect in their second prediction—that the American people would object enough for Nixon to 
lose re-election.240 At least some credit for preventing the second prediction from coming to 
fruition goes to the administration’s public messaging.  
The path from failure on 18 March to announcing success on 7 April was not a natural 
one, but one carved deliberately by Nixon, his White House team, and their surrogates inside and 
outside of government. With the president’s television appearances on 22 March and 7 April, the 
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240 Joseph Kraft predicted on 23 March that “Laos marks a sea change in public opinion on the war,” continuing 
later, “The President can no longer take the country in tow on Vietnam simply by saying Forward March.” Joseph 
Kraft, “Nixon’s Waning Support,” The Washington Post, 23 March 1971. One New York Times reader predicted on 
27 March that if Nixon tried to call Lam Son a success, he would lose re-election, writing, “the American public will 
still recognize [Nixon’s] failure as well as his unfulfilled hawkish inclinations.” Edward Jayne, “Laos…‘One More 
Such Victory,’” The New York Times, Letters to the Editor, 27 March 1971. 
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administration redirected the narrative by redefining success from military victory to fulfilling a 
moral duty and by extending the boundaries of the debate from the borders of Laos to freedom 
around the world. Unlike Cambodia the year before, this strategy worked in 1971 because Nixon 
correctly read the public opinion landscape and told a war-weary American people what they 
wanted to hear.  
James Reston wrote in his 1991 memoirs about his reluctance to write about the Vietnam 
War once more. “From first to last, I felt that war involved so many lies, cost so many lives, 
divided so many friends, and raised so many questions about the judgment of our officials that I 
hated to think about raking through the rubble one last time.”241 The war left a legacy upon 
American, Vietnamese, and Southeast Asian societies that can be felt to this day. The way that 
Americans now question the morality of foreign policy decisions, America’s role in the world, 
and the credibility of news is, in large part, because of Vietnam. However, by looking at this 
period of the war from 18 March to 7 April 1971, another legacy emerges—one of presidential 
communications. 
This legacy upon American society is perhaps just as indelible. President Nixon’s actions 
after Lam Son 719 showed that failure could be spun into success. Just because the media 
repeated its refrain that Lam Son 719 was a failure for Vietnamization, the Nixon White House 
overcame that obstacle through deliberate and effective messaging to the American people and 
strategic outreach to China and the Soviet Union, all with assistance from increasing public 
indifference to the war. Before his 7 April speech, President Nixon told Henry Kissinger, 
                                                            
241 Reston, Deadline, 313. 
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“People don’t want to hear about sorrow so much.” 242 So Nixon stopped talking about sorrow. 
And then, so did the American people. 
  
  
                                                            
242 Telcon; Henry Kissinger/the president; 7 April 4:10pm; folder Conversations – Chron File, 1-7 April 1971 (2 of 
2): Box 9; Kissinger Telcons; Nixon Library. 
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